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Que n'a-at-on fait pour s'approprier Feau? 
Que n'a-t-on invents pour s'excuser de navoir fait? 
Quel crime n'a-t-on commis pour n'avoir pas a s'en 
excuser? Quelle raison d'stat n'a-t-on invoquse 
pour s'en assurer la possession exclusive? 
(de Laet, 1992) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
And Lot also, who went with Abram, had 
flocks, and herds, and tents. And the land was not 
able to bearthem, that they might dwell together; for 
their substance was great, so that they could not 
dwell together. 
(Genesis, 13:6) 
Both Biblical and modern Israel have been vitally concerned 
with water. The first explicit ecological reference in the Bible relates 
to the carrying capacity of pasture and water supplies that were 
coming under stress from growth in the herds owned by Abraham and 
by his nephew Lot. One of the periodic droughts of the region starts 
the drama that leads to the Exodus story. More recently, the 
challenge to "make the desert bloom" brought Jewish settlers into 
what was first a Turkish colony and then a British protectorate. Later 
projects, such as the draining of the Hula wetlands and construction 
ofthe National Water Carrier, were hailed as symbols ofthe potential 
to live productively and comfortably in an and region -- if at the same 
time they were described by Arabs as "aggressive expansionist 
ambitions threatening all Arabs alike" (cited in Rothman and Lowi, 
1992, p. 62). 
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IMAGE AND REALITY 
The State of Israel is commonly regarded as presenting a 
model of sound water management. The reality is, however, different 
from the image. Israel has done quite well in micro-level choices to 
ensure that water is consumed efficiently at the point of use; it has 
done much less well in macro-level decisions that allocate water 
among alternative uses and users. As a result, Israel is now 
confronting a water crisis, not in the future but at present. 
Domestic Aspects 
The Israeli public has been made acutely aware ofthe nation's 
dependence on water and its vulnerability to water shortages. The 
whole region experienced a severe drought throughout the latter half 
of the 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s. Water reservoirs in 
Israel fell to historic low levels, and, for almost the first time in recent 
history, restrictions on water use were imposed, particularly on 
farmers. (Conditions were even worse in Jordan, where urban 
dwellers were without water for many hours a day.) The drought 
broke with heavy rains (and snow in Jerusalem and Amman) during 
the winter of 1991-92, but further droughts will occur. 
This concern is not merely an academic issue. Water is 
essential for irrigated agriculture, and each political party in Israel 
has strong ties to agricultural areas. Tension rises to great heights 
when, as occurred two years ago, the State Comptroller claimed that 
favouritism toward farmers in water allocation and pricing had not 
only created the water shortage but was damaging the nation's fragile 
economy. Similar, if more moderate, tensions are present when the 
Ministry ofthe Environment suggests that agricultural and industrial 
pollution are endangering sources for drinking water and that 
municipalities should improve their sewer systems or industries their 
wastewater flows. 
International Aspects 
Water is not solely a domestic issue, either. In Postel's (1992) 
words, the Middle East is "the most concentrated region of [water] 
scarcity in the world." The international aspects of Israeli water 
problems have four dimensions. First, the extent to which Israel's 
water supply originates in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a 
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source of much criticism both within and outside the country. Water 
is one of five topics being treated in separate multilateral peace 
negotiations that parallel the bilateral negotiations between Israel 
and each of her Arab neighbours. In the absence of an equitable and 
efficient resolution of Israeli-Palestinian water issues, no peace 
agreement can last for very long. 
Second, insofar as the Jordan River is concerned, Israel is a 
strong, downstream riparian. This is a common situation in the 
Middle East; Egypt is in the same position on the Nile, and Syria and 
Iraq on the Euphrates. As Kolars (1990) points out, over half of the 
population in the Middle East and North Africa, outside the Mahgreb, 
depend upon water from rivers that cross an international boundary 
before reaching them, or they use desalinated water or water from 
deep wells. Policies and institutions developed for water resources 
shared by Israel and its neighbors are likely to be applied more widely 
in international water law. 
Third, with its modern economy and western living standards, 
Israel exhibits a level and pattern of water demand that is currently 
atypical of the region. However, there is hardly a country in the 
region that is not experiencing alarming growth in its demand for 
water, and few are instituting significant conservation programs 
(Akkad, 1991; Hillel, 1991). Apart from the impact of Israel's 
military occupation of the Territories (an impact with long-term 
consequences that should not be ignored), solutions for water 
problems in Israel will have relevance for other Middle Eastern 
countries. 
Finally, as Kolars (1990, p. 57) states, "... sharing of scarce 
water supplies is the single most important problem facing Middle 
Eastern populations." Kolars implies what others have stated flatly 
(eg, Starr and Stoll, 1988; Naff, 1990): namely, in the absence of 
sharing, a war over water -- probably the water of the Jordan River 
-- is likely if not inevitable. This makes water in this region not 
merely an example of environmental change and conflict but of 
environmental change and "acute national and international con- 
flict," which is to say "conflict involving a substantial probability of 
violence" (Homer-Dixon, 1991, p.77; emphasis in original). Any 
such military action would likely be as futile economically as tragic 
for the people. "Going to war over water will solve little, since the 
reserves of all the disputants combined are sorely inadequate" 
(Shuval, 1992, p. 142). 
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A TRIPLE CRISIS 
With all of these factors playing a strong role, what had been 
a fairly technical subject has in recent years come to be more widely 
appreciated, as indicated by the number of articles appearing in the 
daily or weekly press.' At the same time, the number of references 
in professional journals and in the grey literature (unpublished 
reports etc.) is growing rapidly. The issue of water today is 
somewhat in the same position as energy in the early 1970s, subject 
to great concern and under study by a growing number of analysts, 
but prior to any apparent agreement as to resolution or even a 
common approach for resolution. 
What is apparent, even at this time, is that Israeli water 
problems are not limited simply to considerations of scarcity, but are 
a result of three inter-related and interacting crises: 
The first crisis is one of water supply and demand. Since the 
mid-1970s, demand has outstripped supply. Population growth 
through natural increase and in-migration continue to put pressure on 
the water system, and many proposals for economic expansion 
would, if implemented, augment the pressure -- yet there is no evident 
way to increase supply. 
The second crisis involves deteriorating water quality. Much of 
the nation's water has been -- and is still being -- polluted by growing 
volumes of industrial and agricultural wastes, and in some cases by 
human sewage. 
Finally, Israel's water crisis also has geopolitical dimension. 
Roughly one-third of the water consumed in Israel comes from 
groundwater that originates as rainfall over the West Bank -- on land 
that in any final settlement is likely to belong to Palestinians. The 
dependence of both peoples on the same water has led to what many 
have called a zero-sum game. 
'As a sampling: New York Times (16 April 1989); Vancouver Sun (7 May 
1991); The (Toronto) Globe & Mail (18 December 1991); Le Monde (29 January 
1992); The Financial Post (31 January 1992); Guardian Weekly (24 and 31 May 
1992). See also a series on water, including the Middle East, in the British science 
weekly, New Scientist; especially articles by Fred Pearce (1 June 1991 and 7 
December 1991). 
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ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
The purpose of this monograph is to review each of the three 
crises (respectively, Chapters IV through VI) and to provide a set of 
regional options and policy recommendations for the future. How- 
ever, before proceeding to study the crises, we first review briefly the 
geography, hydrology and climate of Israel, and, to a lesser extent, 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Chapter II). In addition, the 
structure of water supply and demand in Israel is discussed, as well 
as the infrastructure that has been developed to manage supply and 
demand in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Chapter 
III). These two preliminary chapters are required partly because they 
provide the ecological and institutional bases from which all options 
for the future must begin, and partly because the interrelated nature 
ofthe three crises requires that solutions be found simultaneously for 
all three. The paper concludes with chapters presenting regional 
options for the future (Chapter VII), a preliminary set of recommen- 
dations (VIII), and conclusions (IX). 
DATA: A Fouffm CRISIS 
Concerns about data availability, validity and reliability are 
common to all studies of water supply and demand. However, in the 
Middle East, these concerns rise almost to the point of becoming a 
fourth "crisis." Water is a strategic resource: vital for state security, 
for human well-being, and for economic development. As such, 
many countries in the region keep most data on water availability and 
use confidential. In other cases, data may be released but be 
purposely misleading. In still others, data are not available simply 
because the country lacks any regular monitoring program. 
Problems do not end even when data are available. Inevitably, 
one faces problems of measurement and sampling error, and of 
aggregation. Moreover, just as with energy, water suppliers are few 
and consumers many, so data on "consumption" are typically 
measured at the point of dispatch, not at the point of use. They almost 
never distinguish among end-users and end-uses below the level of 
three broad sectors: domestic, including municipal; agricultural; and 
industrial. Then, too, there is a problem with complementarity, as 
each country typically has its own set of data and is unwilling to 
accept the often conflicting data from another country or from an 
international agency. 
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These problems, which make analysis of water data and 
development of policy options problematic at best, are all exagger- 
ated in the Middle East. Until recently, almost all data on water in 
Israel were treated as state secrets, and it is still said that journalists 
must submit articles on water for review by military censors. 
Palestinians complain vehemently that they cannot get access even to 
those data that are unclassified, and that any data provided to them 
are so massaged as to make the numbers useless for analysis. As 
well, Palestinians have been blocked from receiving some remote 
sensing data and satellite images because the international agencies 
that collect them can only release them to "states," and of course the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories are not formally a state. 
The quality and availability of water data are central to 
concerns at the multilateral peace negotiations. Data issues also 
came forward strongly at an academic meeting in late 1992 of Israeli 
and Palestinian water specialists, and both sides, but notably the 
Israelis, pledged to work to improve availability in the shortest time 
possible. 
All data used in this report are cited, and every attempt has 
been made to check the reliability of "rumours" that seem to pervade 
the literature on water in the Middle East. 
SOME DEFINITIONS 
Throughout the paper, we use "Israel" in two senses. From the 
perspective of political power, the term refers to the State of Israel, 
which at this time also includes the military administration of the 
West Bank and the Gaza. Strip. From the perspective of geography, 
the term refers to land contained within the boundaries of pre-1967 
Israel. (The pre-1967 borders are also implied by references to land 
"within the Green Line", which is essentially where armies were 
when a truce was declared in 1948.) We use "Occupied Palestinian 
Territories" to refer generally to areas under Israeli military admin- 
istration. Where appropriate, we refer specifically to the West Bank 
or the Gaza Strip. However, information on the Gaza Strip is more 
limited than that on the West Bank, so in some cases we extrapolate 
from the latter to the former. 
Definitional problems provide additional difficulties in deal- 
ing with water data. So far as water is concerned, "consumption" is 
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an ambiguous term. It can refer to withdrawals from natural 
waterways, be they on the surface or underground. However, much 
ofthe water so withdrawn simply runs off fields or through industrial 
plants and back into the waterways. In a literal sense, only that 
proportion of the water that is evaporated (or evapotranspirated; ie, 
evaporated through the leaves of plants), drunk or incorporated into 
final products is truly consumed (Pearse et al, 1985). However, it is 
much more difficult to measure water consumption in this narrower 
sense. Moreover, even if the volume withdrawn and returned is 
identical, there is always some degradation in water quality. 
The word "water use" is equally ambiguous. In addition to 
water used after withdrawal, water has flow uses (as with hydropower 
and dilution) and in-place uses (as with recreation, fisheries and 
habitat protection), which also have economic as well as esthetic 
value (Muller, 1985; Pearse et a1,1985). Except for hydropower and 
perhaps recreation, almost no account is taken (and not just in the 
Middle East) of flow or in-place uses. 
For the purposes ofthis study, water consumption and use will 
be taken as synonymous. In almost all cases, they are measured at 
the point of water withdrawal, not of final consumption. Other 
definitions the reader may find useful are included in Box 1. 
The unit of measure for water in this report is generally million 
cubic metres (Mcm) or litres (L). Each cubic metre contains one 
thousand litres; one litre is equal to 0.22 imperial gallons; so one 
cubic metre is equal to 220 imperial gallons. Rainfall is measured in 
millimetres (mm); 25 mm of rain equals about one inch. A useful 
standard is the 500 mm line, which is the minimum for growing wheat 
without irrigation. 
Costs are all given in United States dollars of 1990 to 1991. 
Because the conflict over water in the Jordan River basin is 
central to the broader conflict that "engaged two nationalist move- 
ments, each struggling for its right to national identify and national 
existence, while denying the adversary these same rights" (Rothman 
and Lowi, 1992, p. 57), Appendix A provides a succinct summary 
of the "claims, counter-claims, fears and concerns" of Palestinians 
and Israelis. It is adapted from a recent essay by Shuval (1992). 
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GLOSSARY 
Aquifers: An aquifer is 
a bed of rock that is 
either permeable enough 
to permit water to flow 
through the pores (usually 
very slowly) or soluble 
enough to permit the 
water to create its own 
channel through which it 
can flow (generally more 
rapidly). Deeper wells 
and bore holes that can 
pierce rock are needed to 
tap aquifers. 
Catchment/Drainage 
Area: The area that is 
drained by a river, or 
which contributes (even- 




More than half of Israel's 
water comes from 
underground sources such 
as springs and aquifers. 
Groundwater Mining: 
Pumping more water out 
of an aquifer than is 
contributed annually 
through precipitation or 
other form of recharge. 
Over-pumping: Over- 
pumping or "mining" an 
aquifer implies removing 
more water than is 
replenished on an annual 
basis. 
Recharge Area: The 
spatial extent of the area 
that recharges an aquifer. 
that is, any precipitation 
falling in the region will 
seep into the ground and 
replenish the aquifer, or 
any lake or river from 
which water seeps into 
the aquifier. 
Saltwater Intrusion: 
Over pumping (or 
mining) an aquifer near 
the coast (such as the 
Coastal Aquifer in Israel) 
can "draw" in saltwater 
from deeper underground 
or from the sea. 
Surface Water Sources: 
Water sources on the 
surface of the earth, such 
as rivers, lakes and seas. 
Wadi: Stream or river 
that flows primarily 
during the rainy season in 
an otherwise and region. 
Water Table: The level 
at the top of underground 
water. Depending on the 
amount of precipitation 
and recharge, the water 
table can be raised or 
lowered. 
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II. SOURCES OF WATER: 
NOTES ON GEOGRAPHY, 
HYDROLOGY AND CLIMATE 
And We send down from the sky rain charged 
with blessing. And We produce therewith gardens 
and grain for harvests. 
(Koran) 
A major constraint to further economic development -- per- 
haps the major constraint -- faced not just by Israel, but by most 
countries in the Middle East, is the limited amount of rainfall. 
Compared with other countries in the region, the availability ofwater 
in Israel is about average: less well endowed than Lebanon, Syria and 
Turkey; about equivalent to the countries ofNorth Africa; and much 
better endowed than Jordan and countries of the Arabian peninsula. 
(See Figure 1, which plots countries against a set of water stress 
codes introduced by Falkenmark, 1989.) 
The West Bank is relatively well endowed with water re- 
sources, though much of the water could only be exploited with 
capital-intensive techniques (Heller and Nusseibah, 1991; Zarour 
and Isaac, 1991). Gaza, in contrast, is perennially short of water and 
has been in a water deficit position for a number of years (Bruins et 
al, 1991; Shawwa, 1992). Apart from Gaza and the Negev, the main 
water problem for both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territo- 
ries is less total availability than seasonal and regional variations in 
availability, a point to which we will return below. 
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VARIED GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY 
Lying along the eastern shore of a sea, and at the junction of 
four geographic and ecological zones, Israel's ecology is more varied 
than that of most other countries in the region, indeed than most 
others in the world. Within the relative small area of 20 thousand 
square kilometres, ecologists have identified 2600 plant species (130 
of which are indigenous to Israel), 480 bird species, 70 mammalian 
species, and 90 reptile species (Gabbay, 1992). 
Geographically, Israel can be divided into three zones aligned 
in a north-south direction (Reifenberg,1955; see Figure 2). The most 
westerly is the coastal plain, 15 to 20 km wide, facing the Mediter- 
ranean Sea. It lies several tens of metres above sea level and contains 
most of the nation's population and industry. The Gaza Strip is 
found at its most southerly point, abutting the border with Egypt. 
The middle zone consists of the Judean hills, which are deeply 
dissected but include peaks over 800 metres above sea level. This 
chain forms the watershed between land sloping gradually (except in 
the north) westward to the Mediterranean and land sloping (much 
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zone is the Jordan Valley itself, which forms the northern limit ofthe 
Great Rift Valley of Africa. The West Bank includes the eastern 
slope of the mountainous middle zone plus the northwestern shore of 
the Dead Sea and northward for about two-thirds of the length of the 
Jordan River. 
CLIMATE AND VARIATIONS IN CLIMATE 
Israel's climate is equally varied. Prevailing southwesterly 
winds blow off the sea in the north, bringing substantial moisture, 
while the same winds blow from Egypt in the southern parts of the 
country and are devoid of moisture. The resulting climate ranges 
from almost subtropical in the north (subalpine on the upper slopes 
ofMt. Hermon, at the northern end ofthe Golan Heights) to quite and 
in the Negev Desert only 500 kilometres to the south. It is also 
variable throughout the year, with the typical Mediterranean cycle of 
hot, dry summers and mild, rainy winters. Rainfall averages 1000 
millimetres per year in parts of Galilee in contrast to 20 mm in the 
southern Negev. Changes in rainfall occur over short distances; for 
example, the Gaza Strip is only about 45 km from north to south, but 
rainfall averages 350 mm per year at the northern end and only 150 
mm at the southern (Zarour and Isaac, 1991). 
Variations in climate, and particularly in rainfall, do not end 
with season and location. Even greater variations occur from year 
to year, with the region lurching from successive years of drought or 
near-drought conditions to other years of rains so heavy as to causing 
flooding and loss of life. Over just a few years, annual rainfall may 
vary by a factor of ten -- that is, ten times as much rain falls in some 
years as in others. As a result, reliable flow -- defined as the discharge 
that could be expected 90 percent ofthe time, or during nine years out 
of ten (Foster and Sewell, 1981) -- may be only 5 to 10 percent of 
average flow in the Jordan River basin. (By way of comparison, 
reliable flow is 60 to 80 percent of average flow in Ontario and 
Quebec, and 30 percent in the southern Prairies of Canada.) 
These year-to-year variations in rainfall in the Middle East 
have enormous implications for water planning and management. 
Extreme years must be treated as normal, not abnormal, events, 
which implies emphasis on risk minimization. Therefore, for either 
short-term or long-term waterplanning, it is much more important 
to have a good understanding of the spatial, seasonal and annual 
variations in rainfall than of annual or national averages. 
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HYDROLOGICAL, CONDITIONS 
Given this ecological and climatological situation, it is hardly 
surprising to find that hydrological conditions also vary, both from 
north to south and from winter to summer. More than 85 percent of 
the country's surface water resources are located in the north. By far 
the largest river is the Jordan, which flows into Lake Kinneret (the 
Sea of Galilee), a natural freshwater lake located 209 metres below 
sea level, and then along the border between the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and the nation of Jordan until it disappears into the Dead 
Sea (Figure 2). Despite such quantitative dominance, the entire flow 
of the Jordan is only equal to about one-third of Israeli water 
consumption, and both ecological and political considerations limit 
the amount Israel can take. Most of the other rivers, such as the 
Yarkon in Tel Aviv and the Kishron in Haifa, are short and flow from 
the Judean Hills westward to the Mediterranean through the most 
populous region of the nation. 
Spatial and temporal variations in water flow pose a severe 
distributional problem for Israel. Rainfall and water storage is 
concentrated in the north, whereas demand arises primarily from the 
heavily populated coastal regions and the agricultural areas in the 
southern half of the country. To complicate the situation, water 
demand for both urban and agricultural uses peaks during summer, 
but almost all the rain falls during four winter months. The not- 
surprising result is strong emphasis on maximum use of Kinneret, the 
one natural storage reservoir, and construction ofextensive artificial 
storage capacity. The Yarmuk, which forms the border between 
Jordan and Syria before it enters Israel and joins the Jordan just 
below Kinneret, has a very high winter flow that is currently used to 
dilute the increasingly saline water of the Jordan. Several plans for 
storage and controlled release of this water have been made by 
Jordanian and Syrian officials, presumably with some allowance for 
use on the West Bank, but implementation has always been blocked 
-- originally by lack of agreement between Jordan and Syria and, 
more recently, lack of agreement from Israel. 
Modern Israel would not be possible if she had to depend 
entirely on surface water. Today (and historically) the more impor- 
tant sources of water have been subsurface, mainly aquifers. In 
central Israel, water supply comes from two large aquifers, the 
Coastal Aquifer and the larger Yarkon-Tanninim (or Mountain) 
limestone aquifer (Figure 3). This latter aquifer is actually a 
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compound of several separate aquifers, all of which flow from west 
to east, under the Green Line and onto the coastal plain. In addition, 
there are two other aquifers (Cenomenian-Judean) which flow 
northwestward to the Belt She'an and Jezreel Valleys. Finally, one 
relatively small aquifer with a renewable flow of 125 million cubic 
metres (Mcm) flows eastward into the Jordan Valley and does not 
affect Israeli supplies (Zarour and Isacc, 1991). Together, these 
aquifers now account for more than half of all sweet (non-saline and 
non-recycled) water used in Israel. 
Geographic, climatic and hydrological conditions simply 
provide the backdrop on which the structure of human use of water 
is presented. In some parts of the world, these conditions allow for 
ample water availability, but in and and semi-arid regions, such as 
that of Israel, they are ultimately limiting. As Falkenmark and her 
colleagues (1989) have emphasized, such regions are vulnerable not 
merely because of water scarcity and intermittent droughts but also 
because they are particularly susceptible to stresses engendered by 
humans through mis-use of land (leading to "landscape desiccation") 
and through population growth. What is even more problematic is 
that appropriate ways of dealing with these problems are generally 
small in scale and locale-specific, but typical approaches to them 
have "a frontier philosophy, manipulating natural systems to what- 
ever degree engineering know-how would permit" (Postel, 1993, p. 
23). Accordingly, we now turn to the specific ways in which water 
resources are used and managed in Israel. 
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Figure 3. Map of the mountain and coastal aquifers, Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
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III. WATER SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND: STRUCTURE 
AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
For the Middle East has undergone an amazing 
decline from former times of more numerous 
populations, higher standards of living, much better 
agriculture, and more general irrigation of farm 
lands, and better practices of soil conservation. 
(W.C. Lowdermilk, introduction to Reifenberg, 1955) 
Water, its availability or lack thereof, has been the historic 
resource problem not just of Israel but of the whole region. Neither 
local nor regional politics can be understood without reference to 
water (surface and underground), nor can patterns of water supply 
and use be understood without reference to internal and external 
politics (Lowi, 1991; Hosh and Isaac, 1992), and even to culture 
(Rothman and Lowi, 1992). 
The region has long suffered from mis-use of both land and 
water resources (Reifenberg, 1955). Hillsides have lost their vegeta- 
tive cover, streams that were once perennial now dry up shortly after 
a rain, and productivity of fields and orchards have declined. A 
secular trend to lower rainfall may account for part of the degrada- 
tion problem, but the greater part appears to be anthropogenic. Since 
creation of the State of Israel, enormous efforts have been made to 
restore land to earlier, more productive conditions (Hillel, 1991), 
but, as will be described below, the same kind of attention has not 
been paid to the water resources that interact with land to promote 
sustainable ecologies and economies, nor has the same kind of 
attention been devoted to land and water lying outside the Green Line. 
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In Israel, the structure of supply and demand for water, the 
infrastructure of water management, and the geopolitics of water are 
all inter-linked. This is to be expected. For one thing, the boundaries 
of surface water supply sources do not coincide with political 
boundaries. As has been true since Biblical times, control over lakes 
and rivers in many parts of the world is very much in dispute. The 
same is true of groundwater, and in this case the problem is 
compounded because of the absence of any agreed body of interna- 
tional law (Hayton and Utton, 1989; see section VII.A.2, below). 
(Ironically, in the case of Israelis and Palestinians, the difficulties are 
compounded by the remarkably close overlap, as shown in Figure 3, 
of the geological position of the Mountain Aquifer and the political 
boundaries of the West Bank.) And, finally, throughout the region 
one finds major reliance on megaprojects to couple regions of high 
demand with those of ample water availability, and such projects 
involve either international effects on resources or international 
sources of capital -- or, most commonly, both. 
CONSUMPTION 
Water consumption in Israel, by sector, between 1958 and 
1991 is depicted in Table 1 and Figure 4. Broad comparisons to 
Canada, by any standard a water-rich country, and to Jordan, by any 
standard a water-poor country, are presented in Table 2. The most 
glaring difference is between non-agricultural water use in Canada 
and in either Israel or Jordan, a difference that reflects differences in 
both climate and lifestyles or habits. However, smaller differences 
are also relevant. Non-agricultural water use in Israel is twice that 
in Jordan, a result, among other things, ofgreater resource availabil- 
ity and the use ofwater to provide a high quality of urban life in Israel. 
Both nations are comfortably above the 100 litres per person-day 
generally regarded as the minimum necessary for human health and 
hygiene.2 (As will be discussed below, this is not the case for the 
Gaza Strip.) In contrast, despite similar crops, Israel uses less than 
one-half as much irrigation water per hectare as does Jordan, the 
difference being the result of more advanced (and more capital- 
intensive) technology. Given the difference in climate, the data also 
suggest that irrigation is more efficient in Israel than in Canada. 
'Each cubic metre contains 1000 litres, so litres per day can be derived from 
cubic metres per year by dividing by 365 and multiplying by 1000. At the extreme, 
Bedouins may use as little as 15 to 30 litres of water per day. 
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Israel's fresh water demand approaches 1900 Mcm per year 
(although it is much lower in drought years; see Table 1). (Another 
150 Mcm of saline water is used in agriculture, and 30 Mcm in 
industry.) Other estimates have reported total consumption as low 
as 1700 Mcm and as high as 2100 Mcm (in 1989), differences that 
exemplify the difficulty in deriving accurate water balances for the 
region. The primary consumer is agriculture, and the dominant use 
is irrigation, which takes approximately 1200 Mcm of sweet and 
recycled water every year (just over 70 percent of total consumption 
if saline water is included; just under if it is not). Domestic and 
municipal uses, which include everything from households and 
hotels to urban gardens and fire protection, account for just under 
one-quarter of total use. Israeli industry accounts for less than 7 
percent of total use. 
Most of Israel's consumption occurs within the Green Line, 
but 40 to 50 Mcm per year are taken directly by Israeli settlements 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Zarour and Isaac, 1991; 
Lowi, 1992). Demand for water in the settlements has been rising 
faster than population, as a result of increasing per capita demands 
for both irrigated acreage and domestic amenities. Therefore, water 
use could continue to increase even if the number of settlements 
remains steady. 
Water use per capita and per dollar of output has fallen 
dramatically over the past 30 years because of efficiency improve- 
ments (Hillel, 1991; Gabbay, 1992). Drought-enforced reductions 
in allocations to the agricultural sector are responsible for much of 
the drop in consumption since 1989. Despite these relative gains, 
absolute consumption remains high, due to continued growth in 
population and in economic output, and a crisis of water supply is 
evident almost every year and magnified during times of drought. 
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TABLE 1. )FRESHWATER CONSUMPTION IN ISRAEL, BY 
SECTOR, 1958 - 1991 MILLION CUBIC METRES 
Year Domestic Industry Agriculture Total 
1958 196 46 1C32 1274 
1964-65 199 55 1075 1329 
1969-70 240 75 1249 1564 
1975-76 305 95 1328 1728 
1979-80 375 90 1235 1700 
1981-82 385 103 1282 1770 
1983-84 419 103 1356 1878 
1985-86 450 103 1434 1987 
1987-88 447 123 1179 1749 
1989 501 114 1236 1851 
1990 482 106 1157 1745 
1991 445 100 875 1420 
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Figure 4. Water consumption in Israel, 1965 - 1989 
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TABLE; 2. COMPARATIVE DATA ON WATER CONSUMPTION: 
ISRAEL, JORDAN AND CANADA 
Israel Jordan 
Population, millions 
4 8 4.2 
(1990) 
. 
GDP W US (1990) 53 200 3 330 
Irrigated Land, 
million hectares 215 56.4 
(1989) 
Water Use(Year, 
Million cubic metres 1200 534 
Irrigation (1990) 






on cubic metres 550 288 38 651' 
Other (1990) 
Water Use/ycem 
Watcx UselYear,' a 
iP 
Million cubic metres ° 
Water Use 
cubic metres, per 
capita, per year 
Water Use 
litres/GDP per year 
Non-irrigation 
Water Use 
cubic metres, per 
capita, per year 
Irrigation Water Use 
cubic metres, 
per irrigated hectare 
per year 
1750 822 42210 
364 196 1 655 
32.9 246.8 74.0 
114.6 68.6 1 510 
5.6 9.5 3.9 
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AVAIIABILITY (1): PRINCIPAL, SOURCES 
Israel exploits three natural sources of fresh water for its 
needs, as noted above: Lake Kinneret (and the sources of the lake); 
large aquifers, notably the Yarkon-Tanninim (or Mountain) Aquifer, 
which extends from the West Bank into Israel, and the Coastal 
Aquifer; and smaller aquifers and streams within its own boundaries. 
Surface Water 
It is estimated that Israel's renewable water resources equal 
approximately 1400 Mcm per year, with an additional 360 Mcm 
added through re-use programs and some 60 to 100 Mcm from 
collection and storage of storm run-off (Beaumont, 1989; McDonald 
and Kay, 1988; Kolars, 1992; see Table 3). Total river flows 
account for somewhat over one-third of the total, with 90 percent of 
that coming from the Jordan. Northern tributaries to the Jordan 
River, which deliver approximately 540 Mcm to Lake Kinneret 
(Kolars, 1992) come from Lebanon (the Hasbani River), Israel (the 
Dan Spring) and the Golan Heights (the Banias River and Hermon 
Spring). These flows combine with local runoff and precipitation to 
represent the total inflows to the Lake, which has a total storage 
capacity of approximately 4000 Mcm. The National Water Carrier, 
which is the main distributional system for water from Lake Kinneret 
south to the Negev (see Figure 2) draws annually 500 Mcm from the 
Lake. Roughly 70 Mcm ofwater passes out ofthe Lake to the Jordan 
River, which then combines with the Yarmuk River, the Zarqa River, 
various salt springs and precipitation/runoff for an annual flow of 
697 Mcm (and a salinity of 2000 ppm) by the time it reaches the Dead 
Sea (refer to Figure 5 for a schematic diagram of Jordan River water 
flow). No major additions to surface water are expected in the future 
except through greater use of recycled wastewater, water harvesting, 
and desalination of brackish water in special areas (see below). 
Underground Water 
As indicated above, the major source of fresh water in Israel 
is derived from underground sources. Israel has long tapped the 
Coastal and Mountain Aquifers, and these remain the principal 
sources of supply. Total renewable groundwater potential is esti- 
mated at approximately 850 Mcm per year (Table 3), although 
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discharge figures vary from about 650 to 900 Mcm per year (Lowi, 
1991). Just over twice as much is taken from the Mountain Aquifer 
as from the Coastal. The West Bank is also underlain by aquifers 
that now in several directions. However, the Gaza Strip has only a 
single, relatively shallow fresh water aquifer that, it is claimed, is cut 
off from other parts of the Coastal Aquifer. (A larger and deeper 
aquifer is too salty for direct use.) Even before the 1967 War, Israel 
was exploiting two of three aquifers under the West Bank, and since 
the War the third source has been tapped for an additional 66 Mcm 
annually (Anderson, 1988). 
TABLE 3. SOURCES OF FRESH WATER IN ISRAEL, 1972 AND 
1990 ANNUAL SUPPLY, MILLION CUBIC METRES 
1972 1990 
Total Ground Water 830 840 
Sandstone Aquifer 240 230 
Limestone Aquifer 590 610 
Total Surface Water 610 650 
Jordan Watershed 570 570 




Domestic 35 300 
Industrial 4 60 
Desalinated Wa& 
Total Available Fresh 
1.0 40 
Water 
1480 1 890 
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All aquifers are vulnerable to declines in water levels as a 
result of excessive pumping, which reduces the water level and 
permits the intrusion of salt water from nearby saline aquifers or 
from the Mediterranean. Already, some 10 percent of the wells 
tapping the Coastal Aquifer yield water that exceeds the national 
limit for chlorine salts, and the percentage is increasing year after 
year. Maintaining the level and quality of water in the Mountain 
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AVAII,ABIIdTY (2): SUPPLEMENTAL. SOURCES 
Conventional surface and groundwater sources are no longer 
adequate to meet the demands of a growing population and an 
expanding economy. There are, however, other sources available. 
By the year 2000, Israeli water use is expected to grow by 150 Mcm 
per year, entirely from expansion in the use oftreated wastewater and 
of water harvesting methods (Gabbay, 1992). At that time, sources 
should come 52 percent from aquifers and springs, 31 percent from 
the Jordan River and its tributaries, 12 percent from treated wastewater 
and saline water, and 5 percent from harvested rainwater. By early 
in the next century, Shuval (1992) expects recycled water to be one- 
third of the total for both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Recycled wastewater 
Recycled wastewater and water harvesting (collection, stor- 
age and later use of storm run-off) are two other sources that can now 
be treated as conventional even though their application is still 
uncommon outside the Middle East. Israel is among the world 
leaders in recycling sewage, and it now accounts for almost 20 
percent oftotal supply, up from 3 percent two decades ago (Table 3). 
Some 70 percent of the wastewater collected in sewers is being re- 
used (Avnimelech et all 1992). According to the Ministry of the 
Environment, recycled sewage effluents "constitute the most readily 
available and cheapest source of additional water, and provide a 
viable solution to Israel's water scarcity problem" (Gabbay, 1992, 
p. 60). By the end ofthe century, recycled wastewater could provide 
400 Mcm of water per year for irrigation. Former Water Commis- 
sioner Meir Ben Meir has said that irrigated crops in Israel will 
eventually be fed only with recycled wastewater. 
Recycled wastewater is mainly used for the irrigation of non- 
food crops and animal fodder, and also for recharging aquifers. 
Mekorot's (the national water authority) quality standard for recy- 
cled water provided to agricultural consumers is "drinking quality, 
but drinking not advised." While it is acceptable to drink the water 
occasionally, but it is inadvisable to do so on a regular basis, since 
the heavy metals in the water will accumulate in the body over time 
(Moore, 1993). Most of the cotton grown in Israel, for example, 
depends upon reclaimed rather than fresh water. However, after 
secondary treatment and storage for a time in an aquifer, some 
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recycled water is chlorinated and released for unrestricted use in 
irrigation. Despite its benefits, recycled water must be used with 
caution because of the potential for toxic chemicals and pathogens, 
which cannot always be completely removed by conventional 
wastewater treatment, to enter the food chain. As well, aquifers can 
show adverse effects from continued use of reclaimed (or brackish) 
water. All use of recycled water requires a permit from the Ministry 
of Health. Continuous monitoring has indicated the safety of 
recycled wastewater provided treatment levels are high enough 
(Gabbay, 1992). 
Israeli practices for recycling water are now well established 
and are being adopted or adapted by other countries in the region 
(Aboukhaled, 1992; Khouri 1992). However, the European Commu- 
nity has recently moved to prohibit all importation ofproduce irrigated 
with recycled wastewater. Although not yet accepted by all members, 
this could affect the use of the technique. At present no crops exported 
from Israel (except certain fruit trees) are irrigated with recycled water, 
so the initial impact on the Israeli economy of such a policy would be 
small. However, the policy would affect plans to shift agriculture 
completely to recycled water, as suggested by Ben Meir. 
Water Harvesting 
Water harvesting is a technique for constructing small, typi- 
cally micro-scale, dams and trenches to gather and make optimal use 
of rainfall and storm run-off. It was their knowledge of water 
harvesting that permitted the Nabateans and other desert dwellers to 
establish such rich civilizations in the desert two thousand years ago 
(Hillel, 1991; Pearce, 1991a). These techniques are now being 
rediscovered and, with the aid of computers and highly sensitive 
mapping, adapted to modern requirements. Their main uses in Israel 
have been for growing trees and shrubs in areas where rainfall is less 
than 300 millimetres per year, for halting desertification at the 
northern edge of the Negev, and for directing rainwater into channels 
that recharge aquifers rather than allowing it to evaporate. Perhaps 
the most important new application is known as savannization 
(Gabbay, 1992), an application of water harvesting to permit the 
growth of widely spaced tress in a carpet of grasses so as to exploit 
both winter rains and deeper soil moisture, while protecting the soil 
and the aquifers. 
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Use of Brackish Water 
Brackish water (that is, water that contains some salts but is 
less salty than seawater) from aquifers can be used for irrigating salt- 
tolerant crops and strains, which Israel has specialized in developing 
(Golam 1986). As indicated above, Israel is already using some 180 
Mcm per year of saline water for agricultural and industrial pur- 
poses. While most saline aquifers are isolated and thus nonrenewable, 
and while pumping costs are far from negligible, the potential for 
greater use, particularly in the sandy soils along the coastal plain, is 
significant. Citrus trees, for example, cannot tolerate salty water 
while olive, fig and date trees can. Broccoli, tomato, spinach, beet 
and other vegetables can also be grown in salty water -- but only if 
drip irrigation methods are used, which means that the system is 
capital intensive. 
AVAILABILITY (3): DESALINATION 
There are, of course, higher tech alternatives for new supply, 
notably cloud seeding and desalination. Cloud seeding has never 
been very successful. Although it has its supporters, all admit that 
seeding would provide only a marginal addition to available rainfall. 
Desalinating Seawater 
Israel and her neighbours have all looked longingly at 
desalination for 30 years or more (United Nations, 1964). Its appeal 
is easy to understand. One might say that desalination is to water as 
nuclear power is to electricity -- the promise of unlimited supplies 
coupled with the curse of high costs, environmental problems, and 
megaproject fragility. At present, Israel has a 1500 cu.m. desalination 
plant at Eilat, and a 6000 cu.m. plant is under construction (with 
another 6000 cu.m. plant being planned). 
Most studies have found that the high costs and energy 
requirements for desalination make its future as a major source of 
supply questionable. Production costs for plants that start with 
seawater are typically reported to be at least $1 per cubic metre and 
possibly twice that. As Weber (1991) writes, "Only the world's elite 
get their water from the sea." The process requires enormous 
quantities of energy (either to boil the water for distillation or force 
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it through a membrane that extracts the salt), so it is not surprising 
to find that 60 percent of the world's desalination capacity is located 
in oil-exporting countries of Arabian peninsula. Nor is it surprising 
that, prior to its evacuation, Iraq destroyed Kuwait's desalination 
plants. (Kuwait has no stable supply of fresh water.) Even with low 
oil prices, reported production costs for desalinated water are five to 
ten times what urban dwellers pay for delivered drinking water and 
enormously more than what farmers pay. 
A few analysts believe that the figures cited above exaggerate 
the cost of desalination. Dan Hoffman (1992a), from a firm called 
ADAN based in Tel Aviv, has suggested that a combination of 
reverse osmosis and low-temperature multi-effect distillation can 
reduce both operating energy and initial capital requirements, so that 
final (plant-gate) costs would be $0.65 to $0.70 per Mcm. The two 
technologies contain an independent power system and are matched 
with a turbine generator that discharges steam to the distillation plant 
and electricity to the reverse osmosis plant, a "total energy" scheme 
that Hoffman says can achieve overall thermal efficiencies of 80 
percent or more. The plants are deliberately designed to be relatively 
small and modular -- 40 Mcm per year at a capital cost of $143 
million. (including the 25 MW steam turbine). Even these costs are 
twice those of conventional supply in Israel. Seawater desalination 
should therefore be seen as an option for the longer term, and possibly 
then only if lower cost options for demand management and structure 
shifts are ignored. 
Canals to the Dead Sea 
An alternative to stand-alone plants for desalination in the 
near future lies with the renewed interest in Med-Dead or Red-Dead 
proposals to bring seawater from either the Mediterranean Sea or the 
Red Sea and convey it by means of tunnel and canal to the Dead Sea 
(see Figure 2). Because of the 400 metre difference in elevation, the 
projects were originally conceived as a means of generating electric- 
ity (and replacing water in the rapidly diminishing Dead Sea basin). 
Although part of the electricity generated would be required to pump 
water across the Judean Hills (in the case of Med-Dead) or along the 
Jordanian border (in the case of Red-Dead), the plans alleged that 
enough would remain to power a substantial agro-industrial complex 
and thus make the projects viable. Plans for the Red-Dead Canal 
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have now been re-conceived so that all the electricity generated 
would be devoted to desalination and thus reduce by about two-thirds 
the external energy requirements (Gur, 1985). Viability would be 
enhanced by the supply of fresh water to potential agricultural land 
and industrial plants. The estimate cost is approximately $2 billion, 
with a series of hydroelectric stations (costing $340 million each) 
generating electricity and producing desalinated water at half the 
current cost (Moore, 1993). The Italian government has already 
expressed interest in participating in the project. 
Of the two routings, the Red-Dead appears to be the easier and 
cheaper -- for one thing, it avoids the need for tunnelling through the 
Mountain Aquifer -- but is inconceivable in the absence of a formal 
peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. Currently, the "Gur plan," 
which lies entirely within Israel, is attracting most attention. Fresh 
water from springs feeding the Upper Jordan would be diverted to 
recharge the Coastal Aquifer in order to restore its original level and 
quality. This water would be replaced by desalinated water, which 
would be pumped back up to Lake Kinneret and have the added 
benefit of improving water quality in the Lower Jordan (now too 
saline for use). 
While one or another of these desalination proposals surfaces 
from time to time, any routing or diversion would cost billions of 
dollars and both raise very important environmental questions. None 
is likely to be implemented within a time frame that is relevant to the 
decisions needed about resolving current water problems. 
Desalinating Brackish Water 
Brackish water containing 500 to 5000 parts per million 
(ppm) of total dissolved solids can be desalinated for $0.40 to $0.60 
per cubic metre, about one-third the cost of desalinating seawater 
(World Resources Institute, 1992). Water for Eilat at the southern 
tip of Israel has for many years been supplied by a plant that 
desalinates brackish water pumped from an aquifer. A few other 
small plants were built at remote locations not served by the National 
Water Carrier. 
The most common method for desalinating seawater is distil- 
lation, but reverse osmosis, which involves the use of high pressure 
to force the water through a membrane that filters our solids, now 
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accounts for about one-third of world capacity (Ibid.). Hoffman 
(1992b) argues that marginally brackish water (up to 1250 ppm) is 
better treated by nanofiltration, an alternative membrane process 
that operates at low pressure and therefore has energy requirements 
under 1 kWh per cubic metre. He cites capital costs for a plant that 
would 100 Mcm per year to be just over $100 million with the 
desalinated water costing $0.25 - $0.27 per cubic metre. In 
combination with brackish water reverse osmosis, he also argues that 
the process could be used to reduce salinity levels in sewage for 
municipal use or for recharging the Coastal Aquifer (where purifica- 
tion would be completed). An added benefit would be the reduction 
of water hardness so use of detergents and water softeners could also 
be reduced. 
If desalination has a near-term future, it is more likely to lie 
with brackish water than seawater. Some 27 percent of world 
desalination capacity now uses brackish feedstock, and the share is 
growing (World Resources Institute, 1992). Costs are not more than 
twice those of conventional supply, and some decrease can be 
expected. Large reserves of low to moderately brackish water occur 
in aquifers in the Middle East that could be tapped with conventional 
drilling equipment. Much of this is fossil water that is nonrenewable, 
but reserves can be large enough to amortize a sizable plant. 
INIRASmumiRF., MANAGEMENT AND PIANNING 
As a result of the importance of all fresh water, a great deal of 
emphasis has been placed on developing a comprehensive water 
management scheme for Israel (Beaumont et al., 1988). All water 
resources in Israel belong the State. Management decisions on water 
quantities, production and the supply system rest with the Water 
Commissioner, who reports to the Minister of Agriculture. Few 
powers escape the Water Commissioner: The Ministry of the 
Environment is responsible for water quality in natural resources, 
and the Ministry of Health for the quality of drinking water; the 
Ministry ofthe Interior, local authorities, and a few other bodies have 
subsidiary roles (Gabbay, 1992) This structure not only reflects the 
strong linkage between agriculture and water, but also symbolizes 
the conviction that water policy is an essential, but subordinate, 
element of agricultural policy. The State Comptroller has been quite 
critical of the Water Commission for decisions which have contrib- 
36 
Economic, Ecological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Water In Israel 
uted to the recent water crisis in the country. More recently, she has 
joined others in criticizing the Ministry ofAgriculture for developing 
long-term plans for the country that ignore the severe water shortage. 
The Water Commission has two main operational arms: 
Mekorot, the national water authority, and Tahal, the water planning 
company. Mekorot is a public corporation owned jointly by the 
government, the Jewish Agency and the National Federation of 
Labour (Histadrut). It owns and is responsible for the water supply 
infrastructure, including pumping stations, wells, irrigation projects, 
and the National Water Carrier. Tahal is a government corporation 
(although it was on the government's list to be privatized, a move that 
has been delayed under the Labour government, according to Moore 
(1993)) with responsibility for overall water planning, research and 
design. Both of these units must grant permission before any new 
wells are drilled in either Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territo- 
ries. Of the two, Mekorot is the stronger. It is formally accountable 
only to the Minister of Finance and can raise money independently. 
This creates a diffuse structure which manages the water system 
more through "friction" with one another than through cooperation 
(Galnoor, 1980). 
Israel's water supply system is completed by an extensive 
transportation and distribution network. The main component ofthis 
system is the National Water Carrier, an integrated system of large- 
diameter pipes and reservoirs that carries water from Lake Kinneret 
to the central and southern regions of the country (see Figure 2). 
Completed in 1964, the Carrier, which has been described as a means 
of transferring the Jordan from a border to an internal river, can 
transport more than one million cubic metres (Mcm) per day from 
Lake Kinneret and distribute it to coastal areas and the Negev desert. 
The National Water Carrier carries almost 80 percent of Israel's 
surface water (supplemented by some pumping in the south) and 
provides access to water for almost all the country's people. 
DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFUSION OF IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY 
In parallel with its development of a management scheme and 
institutional structure for water, Israel has made a great effort to 
develop and diffuse technologies appropriate for and and semi-arid 
environments. For example, Israelis have extended geophysical 
techniques in the exploration for water and improved drilling meth- 
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ods to permit extraction of water from deeper aquifers. For the 
purposes ofthis study, it is more important to focus on end-use rather 
than production technologies, and of these the most important by far 
have been aimed at irrigation. 
Irrigation is today a highly complex technique with many 
variations for different crops and different climates (Shady, 1989). 
Israel is a world leader in development of drip irrigation, which is a 
technique by which relatively small amounts of water are delivered 
directly to the roots of growing plants by means of perforated plastic 
piping (Gabbay, 1992). When fully developed so that the flow of 
water is controlled by sensors linked to central computers in large 
farms, efficiencies (that is, the proportion of water that reaches the 
roots) can reach 95 percent. Drip and other forms ofmicro-irrigation 
reduce water use by one-third or more, depending upon the crop. 
Despite high capital costs for installation ($1500 to $3000 per 
hectare (Postel, 1993)), nearly half of all irrigated land in Israel is 
now under micro-irrigation (Gabbay, 1992). Only Cyprus has a 
greater share of land under micro-irrigation, but actual acreage is 
only one-quarter of that in Israel. 
In parallel with, and in part as a result of, the shift to capital- 
intensive irrigation methods, Israel has encouraged farmers to shift 
their planting toward crops that have higher unit values in the market, 
mainly fruits and vegetables. Water losses have been further reduced 
by older techniques such as lining canals to reduce leakage -- 
effective but again expensive (Shady, 1989). 
Micro-irrigation techniques have the further advantage of 
reducing adverse environmental impacts typical of land under con- 
tinuous irrigation. Notably, drip irrigation can avoid or reduce the 
salinization that tends to occur on irrigated land in an and climate. 
Flood irrigation also leads to high levels of run-off. If Canadian data 
for the southern Prairies can be taken as an indication, three out of 
every four units flow back to water courses, but typically laden with 
pesticides, fertilizers and chemicals (Pearse et al, 1985). Despite 
drip irrigation, agricultural run-off remains a major environmental 
problem in Israel (see Section V.B.1). 
Taken together, the efforts to increase the efficiency of water 
use in Israeli agriculture have been highly successful. Agricultural 
output has increased using the same amount, or even reduced 
volumes, ofwater (Heathcote, 1983; Hillel, 1991). Waterconsump- 
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tion per hectare has declined from nearly 6400 cubic metres per 
hectare in 1975 to 4500 in the late 1980s. Over the same period of 
time the volume of water consumed per dollar of agricultural output 
has declined from 1.6 to 0.75 cubic metres (Fishelson, 1992). 
Later sections will emphasize water in the Occupied Palestin- 
ian Territories. Suffice it here to say that Mekorot and Tahal do 
operate in the Territories, though mostly in cooperation with the 
military authorities and, to a minor extent, local Palestinian authori- 
ties (West Bank water companies collect water fees and administer 
certain of the rules). To allow for development and implementation 
of technical solutions to water problems in both the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, a significant financial investment would be required, 
and, for the most part, Israel refrains from such a commitment (Starr 
and Stoll, 1988). 
Despite all of the investment in infrastructure, and the im- 
provements in efficiency and the growth in use of recycled and saline 
water, water supply has not kept pace with demand, and the threat of 
water shortage persists. Population growth rates are close to 2 
percent per year, and immigration could significantly increase 
population in both Israel and the Occupied Territories by the 
beginning of the next century. Because of this, Israel's water 
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IV. WATER QUANTITY: 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The country is on the verge of a catastrophic 
water shortage after 25 years of irresponsible ne- 
glect of resources that represent the lifeblood of the 
nation, according to the report on the water economy 
issued yesterday by State Comptroller Miri am Ben 
Porat. 
(The Jerusalem Post, 3 January, 1991 p. l ) 
Prior to the 1967 War, water use in Israel had reached both 
physical and economic limits. The war greatly increased the nation's 
access to water, but, inasmuch as few people seemed to draw lessons 
from earlier experience, use patterns were maintained and the new 
sources also came to be used to -- and beyond -- their limits. Since 
the mid-1970s water use in Israel has been at or near 100 percent of 
the resource potential. According to the Israel Environment Bulletin 
(Spring 1991), consumption exceeds available capacity (the amount 
one can tap before "mining" occurs) by some 200 Mcm per year. 
Moreover, the deficit in the reservoir system (that is, the gap between 
current levels and what is considered a safe operational reserve) had 
reached 1430 Mcm by late 1991 (Ibid.). Adding to the dilemma are 
increasing standards of living (air conditioning etc.) and renewed 
immigration, on the one hand, and several successive years of low 
rainfall, on the other. As noted, the latest drought broke in the winter 
of 1991/92, completely recharging Lake Kinneret and increasing the 
level of the aquifers, but others will occur. 
It is necessary to look at water as an economic problem from 
both short-term and long-term perspectives. The former deals with 
immediate costs and returns as seen by conventional economic 
accounts; the latter with the potential for significant population 
growth and for global change. Between these two, a few comments 
will be made about the implications for regional politics. 
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EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY 
Almost 70 percent ofthe water Israel currently consumes is used 
for agriculture, which is very close to the world average (World 
Resources Institute, 1992). Many countries in the Middle East use 
more than 80 percent oftheir water supplies for irrigation. However, 
even a 70 percent share does seem disproportionate compared with 
agriculture's importance in the economy of Israel. Agricultural 
employment now accounts for less than 4 percent of the labour force 
(Table 4). Although output continues to climb (especially the 
tonnage of vegetables and citrus fruit), agriculture now contributes 
just 5.4 percent of Israel's export earnings (Table 4). It would appear 
that reductions in water use by the agricultural sector could alleviate 
water problems in Israel with no or only a small economic cost. 
TABLE 4. EXPORT EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAF,I,, 
SELF,CTED SECTORS, 1990 











































Total 12 079 _ 1491.9 
Source: Statistical Abstract oflsrael, 1992. 
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Current Misallocation 
The evidence strongly suggests that Israel's water quantity 
crisis is more a result of misallocation than absolute scarcity. As 
many analysts have noted, a shift of water away from agriculture to 
urban and municipal uses, or even to less water-intensive crops, 
would enormously reduce or even eliminate problems of relative 
water scarcity. Rough calculations show that reduction in irrigated 
acreage by about one-third, together with modest improvements in 
end-use efficiency, would be sufficient to bring Israel's water 
consumption and renewable water supply into balance. 
The problem in Israel, as in so many countries, is that farmers 
pay far less than the full cost of delivering irrigation water to them. 
Indeed, most farmers cannot afford to pay a very high price for water 
if the crop is to be sold profitably (Muller, 1985). Within the Green 
Line, farmers typically get water for agricultural use at $0.16 per 
cubic metre, compared with $0.40 for domestic use. Zarour and 
Isaac (1991) estimate that the actual cost to supply water in Israel is 
$0.36 per cubic metre (0.036 cents per litre). Other estimates are 
slightly lower, but none less than $0.30 per cubic metre. Urban 
dwellers, therefore, are paying full average costs (though not neces- 
sarily marginal costs), but farmers are highly subsidized. (Prices are 
the same for Arab and Jewish communities in Israel, but differ in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories; more on this below.) Gideon 
Fishelson of Tel Aviv University (1992a) estimates that only about 
half ofthe water devoted to agriculture in Israel has a marginal value 
greater than its cost. He estimates that appropriate market pricing 
of water would transfer 300 Mcm from inefficient agricultural uses 
to non-agricultural uses, enough to support an additional two million 
people in Israel. 
Even if the level of subsidy for water to farmers in Israel is 
modest by regional standards (Khouri, 1992), the low marginal 
economic productivity of water used in agriculture suggests strongly 
that some water should be reallocated from irrigating crops to 
industrial and household uses. Perhaps flowers and some fruits and 
vegetables exported fresh to Europe can pay the full cost of water, 
but not grains nor most food crops. 
Water is expensive because even conventional water supply 
systems are capital intensive, especially per dollar of revenue 
(Rogers, 1988). According to the World Bank (cited in Starr,1992), 
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the Middle East/North Africa has the highest capital costs of water 
supply in the world. Operating costs are also high. Israel and Jordan 
each use about one-fifth of their electricity just to pump water. (In 
the case of Israel, most of that electricity is used to pump water up 
from Kinneret, which lies 209 metres below sea level, to the National 
Water Carrier.) If conventional systems are capital intensive, non- 
conventional supply alternatives are even more so, and, in the case 
of desalination, very much more so. As indicated above, so too are 
such techniques as installing drip irrigation, lining canals and 
eliminating leakage. About the only options that are not particularly 
capital intensive are those conservation measures that represent 
improved management and better housekeeping. 
The Potential to Reallocate Water 
The emphasis on agriculture in Israel, and the subsidies 
agriculture receives, are well out of proportion to the sector's 
economic importance to the nation. A partial restructuring of the 
Israeli economy away from agriculture and toward light industry, 
services and information technologies would save not only water but 
energy as well. The contribution of the light industrial sector to GDP 
is almost 30 times greater per unit of water than the contribution of 
the agricultural sector (Naff, 1992). From these perspectives, the 
point so often raised -- that Israel is one of the world's most efficient 
users of irrigation water -- misses the main point. 
The strongest attack on water use in agriculture in recent years 
has come from Miriam Ben Porat, the State Comptroller. She 
emphasized the misallocation problem and made explicit reference to 
the close linkage between the Water Commissioner and the Minister 
of Agriculture. She put most ofthe blame for the water crisis on low 
prices and poor management, which have stimulated demand for 
water and reduced incentives to conserve (Shuval, 1992). As the 
subsidized water is commonly used for export crops, the benefit is 
effectively passed on to foreign consumers. Thus, Baskin (1992) 
states ironically that it would be cheaper to import oranges from 
Europe than to grow them in Israel, and he goes on draw the corollary 
that exporting oranges is equivalent to exporting water. More 
formally, the State Comptroller charged that, in terms of contributing 
to the nation's economy, subsidized prices for irrigation water 
actually caused "recognizable economic damage." In making this 
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point, she was merely adding her name to a list of consulting reports 
that date back at least 15 years and that make essentially the same 
point (Kneese, 1976). She also added her voice to earlier calls to 
remove water management from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
place it under an independent state authority that would make 
judgements on overall national priorities. 
During the recent drought, pressure to reduce water alloca- 
tions and subsidies to farmers became too great to resist. Water 
allocations to the agricultural sector have declined since 1986, at first 
by marginal volumes, but by 37 percent in 1990 and fully 50 percent 
in 1991(Lowi, 1992). Statements made at the time promised that the 
lower levels would be in place for at least five years, but, after 
abnormally heavy rainfall in the winter of 1991/92 raised the level of 
Lake Kinneret with enough left over to recharge aquifers, water 
allocations to agriculture were again increased. However, it has been 
estimated that these rains provided Israel with only one year of 
additional supply. 
Those reductions in water allocations to agriculture should 
have provided a great deal of information on the ways in which 
farmers adjust crops, cropping patterns and operations for lower 
water consumption. Unfortunately, a literature review commis- 
sioned by IDRC found no studies on how farmers and others actually 
did cope with reductions of this magnitude, particularly when they 
expected them to be permanent. Data do show that the land under 
drip irrigation declined by 18 percent, and total irrigated land by 15 
percent, during the drought (Postel, 1993). Fishelson (1992a) 
reports that output was down by about one-third at the peak of the 
drought, but this figure compounds secular and cyclical effects and 
is too aggregate to be truly instructive. Detailed information on 
adjustment patterns, which is likely available in the Israeli Ministry 
of Agriculture, would be very useful in determining the timing and 
extent of water reallocation that could occur without causing undue 
hardship and economic loss for farmers who have, quite understand- 
ably, invested in infrastructure and developed management systems 
on the assumption that water would continue to be available in large 
volumes at low prices. 
In the longer term, permanent reallocation ofwater away from 
agriculture -- whether directly, through reduced allocations, or 
indirectly, through marginal cost pricing -- is inevitable. This creates 
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a dilemma for the nation. On the one hand, conversion to more 
efficient farming methods to reduce water demand could be expen- 
sive and, in effect, dilute the dominant role of the agricultural sector 
in Israel's politics and economy (Frey and Naff, 1985; Starr and 
Stoll, 1988). This role has a long history related to the Zionist 
ideology of a Jewish proletariat working (and therefore justifying 
possession of) the land, to national pride in "making the desert 
bloom," and to military security based on a domestic food supply. 
On the other hand, agriculture is playing a smaller and smaller 
role in Israel's economy. This parallels international trends toward 
slower growth in irrigated agriculture, with most gains in production 
now expected to come from existing rather than new supplies of 
water (Postel, 1991; World Resources Institute, 1992). The eventual 
resolution appears to lie with the full substitution of reclaimed 
wastewater for freshwater in agriculture, provided: a) high enough 
standards are applied to the water; b) salt-tolerant, high-value crops 
are selected; and c) appropriate irrigation methods are used. 
Projections of Water Use 
Projections of future water use in Israel vary significantly. 
One set of projections implies steady growth in consumption to 2025 
(Gabbay, 1992). According to Gabbay's (1992) report, which was 
a component of Israel's national report submitted to the Earth 
Summit in Brazil, the greatest absolute and relative growth in water 
consumption is projected for the agriculture sector. (Only the 
industrial sector shows no significant growth in water use.) These 
assumptions assume increasing availability of water in the region, a 
condition which is highly unlikely without major water-sharing 
agreements and importation of water. It is also a scenario which 
would be very costly to the Israeli economy. Fishelson (1992) 
projects similar increases in water consumption, with agricultural 
use increasing to 1800 Mcm per year by 2020, and urban use to 900 
Mcm; the result would be a water deficit for Israel of between 800 
and 1100 Mcm per year. 
A rather different, and more realistic, set of projections has 
been prepared by Tahal as part of a water master plan. Although the 
Tahal projections show substantial growth in water use by the 
domestic and industrial sectors to the year 2000, agricultural con- 
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sumption is expected to remain constant. (These projections refer to 
fresh water; brackish and recycled water are excluded.) Tahal's 
projections include Ministry of Agriculture plans to maintain agri- 
cultural water consumption at 1300 Mcm annually. These projec- 
tions seem all the more reasonable since, in the wake of reduced 
allocations and higher prices, agricultural water consumption in 
1991 fell below 1000 Mcm for the first time since the 1950s. 
A different approach to the problem of projecting future 
requirements is suggested by Shuval (1992). He believes that peace 
depends upon "the principle of a sufficient, fair and equitable 
allocation of essential baseline water for domestic, urban, industrial 
and fresh food use, much of which would be from sources within the 
territory of each partner" (1992, p. 41). Shuval then suggests that 
the basic allocation for all uses except fresh food be 100 cubic metres 
per person-year and that another 25 cubic metres per person-year be 
allocated for growing fresh food. Other agriculture would depend 
upon recycled water. Based on these assumptions, he calculates 
"baseline needs [for fresh water] to assure water security" as in the 
following table. 
TABLF. 5. POPULATION AND WATER CONSUMPTION 
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Source: Shuval, 1992 
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These demands for fresh water are much more modest than 
those usually projected. Although Shuval admits that they are 
attainable only if "coupled with sound measures of water conserva- 
tion," they nevertheless provide a more manageable target, and one 
less threatening to either political or ecological stability. 
Shuval's suggestion for a baseline security approach is inter- 
mediate between the use of projections and the use of scenarios in 
identifying possible water futures. The "soft water path," which is 
depends exclusively on scenarios, is described in Chapter VII with 
other aspects of planning. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THF. POLITICAL SITUATION 
The water supply situation in Israel is complicated by the fact 
that Israel currently draws about one-third of its total fresh water 
supplies, and 50 percent of its drinking water, from sources that 
originate from the West Bank. Most of that water continues to be 
drawn, as it was in the pre-1967 period, by wells within Israel proper. 
(The first boreholes were drilled by Jewish farmers in the 1930s.) 
That is, vertical wells are drilled within the Green Line to reach the 
Mountain Aquifer and bring water to the surface for irrigation and 
other uses. Israel draws between 300 and 350 Mcm per year from 
these wells, which is about half of what the aquifers can supply on 
a fully renewable basis. Such wells are consistent with international 
law, but, as will be discussed later, some ofthe provisions applied on 
the Palestinian side of the Green Line to ensure maximum flow into 
the aquifers are of questionable legality and morality. 
Without any question, Israel would face immediate water 
shortages and significant curtailment of its economic development if 
it lost control of West Bank water resources supplies in a sudden or 
disruptive manner. The state is trapped in what Calleigh (1983) 
refers to as the "hydraulic imperative". The West Bank, then, has 
become a critical source ofwater for Israel, and this fact may actually 
be outweighing other political and strategic factors in its continued 
occupation (Anderson, 1988). 
The same steps outlined above to rationalize the economy's 
use of water could also reduce or eliminate the need for Israel to 
transfer water from the West Bank for consumption elsewhere in the 
country. To now, Israel has clearly given priority to its own water 
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needs at the expense ofthose ofthe Palestinians. Reductions in water 
allocated to Israeli agriculture could be coupled with increases to the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Such action is indicated as much 
by economics as by justice. The West Bank remains far more rural 
than is Israel, with agriculture accounting for more than a quarter of 
its employment and of its gross domestic output (Baskin, 1992). 
Ironically, then, while Israel needs to transfer water out of agricul- 
ture, Palestinians need to transfer water in -- but the latter is feasible 
only if they have access to a greater share of both surface and 
underground water. 
END-USE CONSERVATION 
With the exception of the agricultural sector, nations in the 
Middle East are remarkably sparing in their water use. For centuries, 
the peoples ofthe desert have learned how to make use of every drop. 
Per capita withdrawals in Israel are only about 25 percent, and in 
Jordan only about 17 percent, ofthose in the United States or Canada. 
Nevertheless, all of the countries in the region are using much more 
water than they need to, and enormous potential exists to increase 
efficiency in the use of water and to stimulate greater conservation.3 
The problem, to quote Thomas Naff, is not that these nations are 
inefficient but "that they are not as efficient as the crisis and the 
scarcity requires them to be" (Naff, 1990, p. 170). 
The need to reallocate water was discussed just above. This 
section will demonstrate that, even in the absence of reallocation, 
there are many policies and programs that could be implemented to 
promote greater efficiency and conservation in water use. They will 
be discussed under subheadings of improved price structures and 
then conservation in, respectively, residential uses, commercial and 
industrial uses, and municipal systems. These sections barely 
introduce a subject with an extensive literature. Because it has been 
discussed above, irrigation will not be treated here. Apart from 
"'Efficiency" and "conservation" are commonly used synonymously, but, 
strictly speaking, the former refers to minimizing inputs to achieve a given output 
whereas the latter includes changes in the output. Less formally, efficiency deals 
with how you accomplish some task, while conservation also includes changes in 
the task. 
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irrigation, farms consist of households (analogous to residential 
uses) and processing plants (analogous to industrial operations). 
Clearly the opportunity for conservation is large. Water efficiency 
in Israel lags behind best achievable practices except in irrigation. 
However, except for changes in prices and price structures, none of 
the measures discussed below will be very effective if governments 
at all levels do not insist -- insist very vocally -- on higher levels of 
water conservation and water efficiency, and if they do not demon- 
strate their resolve by highly visible conservation in their own 
operations. 
Alternative Price Structures for Water 
Since water is one of the highest value inputs to the Israeli 
economy, it should be priced accordingly. This means a number of 
things. Most obviously, those who use water should pay the full 
costs, capital as well as operating, to extract, treat as necessary and 
deliver water. Less obviously, price structures should reflect what 
economists call long-run incremental or marginal costs, which is the 
cost of supplying the last unit of water demanded. In this way users 
will be forced to recognize the costs their demands impose on the 
water delivery system. When the system is operating correctly, the 
same principles mean that prices will also reflect opportunity costs, 
or the value of water in alternative uses. While an exception to full 
opportunity cost pricing may be made on grounds of equity for direct 
household consumption (analogous to lifeline rates for electricity), 
the quantities needed to provide everyone with enough water for 
basic needs are so small relative to other uses as to make little 
difference to final results. 
The same principles that argue for pricing of water as an input 
also argue for charges for disposal of wastewater. Appropriate 
charges would vary by volume and toxicity of discharge -- with some 
credit offered for those wastes, such as sewage, that themselves have 
a value. As with water, the objective is to ensure that households, 
industrial firms, and farms take account of the costs their operations 
impose on the system. Unfortunately, charges cannot be applied very 
effectively to non-point sources of wastewater, as with runoff from 
farms. 
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The rationale for pricing water in a way that reflects its true 
costs has been expressed in many reports and is supported by a great 
deal of evidence (Pearse et al, 1985; Brooks et al, 1990; Postel, 
1993). The essential point is that, beyond the amounts needed for 
basic human and household needs, water demand is elastic, and 
notably so in the case of irrigation.' If water is cheap, more will be 
used; if it is expensive, less will be used. If discharge is cheap (or 
unregulated), wastewater flows will be high; if expensive, flows will 
be reduced. Neglect of the elasticity of water demand in current 
pricing structures makes the whole water system inherently ineffi- 
cient from an economic perspective. The low prices create excessive 
demand for water supply or discharge; force up government expen- 
ditures to provide infrastructure to meet this demand; and inhibit 
efforts for conservation and recycling. 
Pearse et al (1985) emphasize that an ideal pricing system for 
water includes two elements: one element is a charge per cubic metre 
consumed; the other is a fixed charge per month. The fixed charge 
covers hook-up costs and other overhead needed to operate the 
system. The charge per unit can be set in many ways but ideally 
equals the marginal cost ofwater supply. Assuming increasing costs 
of supply, which is the case throughout the Middle East, most 
economists would favour a price structure in which unit charges for 
water increase with consumption, commonly referred to as increas- 
ing block rates (Brooks et al, 1990). While not necessarily appropri- 
ate for lower income communities where households have to share 
water taps (Whittington, 1992), as in parts of the Gaza Strip, 
increasing block rates would certainly be appropriate for all users in 
Israel and many users in the cities of the West Bank. The price 
structure can be made to reflect marginal costs even more closely by 
increasing prices during the summer when demands tend to peak and 
supplies come from more limited and expensive sources. Alterna- 
tively, charges could be reduced for users who can use water at off- 
peak periods or who can accept lower quality water that requires less 
treatment. 
'Elasticity is a measure of the effect of price changes on the amount of any 
good or service purchased. The good or service (in this case, water) is said to have 
an elastic demand if the change in quantity purchased is proportionately greater 
than the change in price; it is inelastic if the change in quantity purchased is 
proportionately less. 
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Any approach to efficient price structures for water requires 
that meters to measure water volume, and other meters to measure at 
least the volume of wastewater, be installed at every billing point. 
Fortunately, water meters are ubiquitous in Israel. They are found 
on a unit-by-unit basis within apartment buildings and (for control 
if not billing purposes) on a process-by-process basis within some 
industrial plants. Farms are also metered for water use, but the low 
prices for water mitigates the effect. Wastewater meters are less 
common, and charges for wastewater disposal are only now being 
considered. 
No matter how well designed the price structure, and even if 
price levels are set high enough to cover all costs, supplemental 
policies and programs will be necessary to capture the full range of 
conservation and efficiency options. The supplemental measures are 
necessary in part because of market failures, in part because of lack 
of information on or capital to pay for conservation measures, and in 
part because the market system is only one of the signals to which 
consumers respond (Brooks et a1, 1990). The most common supple- 
mental measures include information services, technical assistance, 
and financial incentives or disincentives. 
Conservation in Residential Uses 
Residential uses ofwater tend to be less price elastic than other 
uses, partly because these uses are essential for life and partly 
because (except forthe poorest people in developing countries) water 
does not account for a very large part of household budgets. The 
major uses for water in housing with internal plumbing are toilet 
flushing, clothes washing, and showers/baths. (Again excepting the 
poorest of the poor, water for drinking and cooking is all but 
negligible.) None of these end-uses is individually large compared 
with agricultural or industrial use of water, but significant overall 
gains are attainable from simple technologies and minor changes in 
habits, even with housing that is already efficient (Brooks and Peters, 
1988). For example, low-flow household faucets cut use to 0.5 litres 
per minute without sacrificing performance, a saving of up to 85 
percent; low- and variable-flow toilets can cut water use by 40 
percent. (These savings are based on comparisons in North America; 
savings would be lower in Israel because ofhigher existing standards 
of water efficiency.) If hot water is saved, the gains are multiplied: 
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energy as well as water. For those housing units with external space, 
lawn and garden watering typically dominates total water use, but is 
more responsive to price than other uses (Brooks et al, 1990). Total 
residential savings (again on a North American base) with existing 
technology is one-third to one-half, with the higher levels applying to 
hot water. 
Market failure from misplaced incentives is common in the 
residential sector. For example, firms or agencies building housing 
units do not in general continue to own or manage them. Given 
market and political pressures to build at low unit cost, they will not 
likely include more water-efficient plumbing if it is significantly 
more expensive. Therefore, housing is the sector where regulations 
for minimum efficiency standards in water-using equipment are most 
appropriate. In the case of Israel, with the pressure to build housing 
for newly arriving immigrants, the need for regulation is that much 
greater. 
If the experience with energy can be taken as a model, 
regulations not only change purchase patterns but stimulate manu- 
facturing research so that the equipment available is improved over 
time. This impact is enhanced if only end-use efficiency is mandated 
(eg, water flow per minute or per flush) and manufacturers are left 
free to determine how best to achieve that level. Regulation is usually 
most effective if coupled with information programs for every part 
of the market: producers, designers, builders, financiers and resi- 
dents. Other measures can also be considered, as with design awards. 
Special forms of government intervention are required to 
stimulate improvements in the water efficiency of existing housing, 
which is large and typically well behind state-of-the-art techniques. 
As a rule, it is more expensive to retrofit existing systems than to 
build new ones. In this case, regulation can help by insisting on 
changes at the time property is sold, and information programs can 
stimulate building owners to install some of the less costly measures 
themselves. Some form of financial incentive for conversion to more 
water-efficient systems may also be appropriate for existing hous- 
ing. Even then, total potential savings are only about two-thirds as 
great as with new housing (Brooks and Peters, 1988). 
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Conservation in Commercial and Industrial Uses 
Commercial and industrial use is heavily concentrated in a few 
sectors, and each sector is significantly responsive to price signals. 
Office and retail buildings generally have relatively low levels of 
water use, but restaurants, hotels, and certain commercial establish- 
ments, such as laundries, can use a great deal of water, much of it hot. 
Most of the technologies appropriate for residences are equally 
appropriate for the hospitality industry, and others, such as self- 
closing valves, can be added. In North America, savings of 10 to 25 
percent have typically been obtained simply by better management 
and very low-cost adjustments to the system. Savings of up to 50 
percent have been achieved with more substantial retrofits, such as 
dual water systems (one for fresh and one for recycled water (Okun, 
1991)), that have paybacks of a year or less at current water prices. 
It is not possible to estimate what the savings might be in Israel, but 
even casual observations indicates wide differences in water effi- 
ciency at different hotels. 
Industrial use of water varies widely both between and within 
sectors. The largest single industrial user of water is for cooling, but 
this is largely nonconsumptive; after use, the water is recirculated or 
returned to the river, warmer but otherwise unaltered. Among 
manufacturing industries of importance in Israel, the food and 
beverage sector and the chemical, petrochemical and refinery sector 
are large water users, though both undertake a great deal of 
recirculation so as to minimize total water requirements. (They are, 
however, less careful about wastewater discharges.) Again, in the 
absence of sector-specific information about output and water use, 
it is difficult to say much about potential savings. Such techniques 
as process metering, mapping of pipes, timers, pressure reductions, 
and heat recovery (to eliminate the need for cooling water), but not 
including recirculation or process change, have yielded savings of 3 0 
to 50 percent; if recirculation and process change are included, 
savings have reached 90 percent (Brooks and Peters, 1988; Postel, 
1993). While higher savings could be expected when starting from 
the water-inefficient plants in North America than with the relatively 
water-efficient ones in Israel, it must also be remembered that the 
required investments were determined to be cost effective at prices 
well under those in Israel. Japan, not particularly water rich, has cut 
its industrial water use by nearly one-fourth, and increased its output 
per litre by 3-1/2 times, in the last 25 years (Postel, 1993). 
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Except for large buildings, where policies and programs 
similar to those for residential uses are appropriate, it is difficult to 
generalize about policies appropriate to commercial and industrial 
uses. Each sector needs to be studied on its own. The one thing that 
is clear is that higher prices and more carefully designed price 
schedules will have a strong effect. The effect will be even stronger 
if supplemented with information and possibly low-cost financing 
aimed at smaller industrial and commercial establishments. Owners 
typically lack both information and of capital, and they may not even 
know how they are using water, nor to what extent they are degrading 
its quality. A program to provide water (and energy) audits at cost 
might prove highly effective. 
Conservation in Municipal Systems 
Municipal use of water includes a great variety of end-uses, 
such as fighting fires, cleaning, irrigating parks, public swimming 
pools, etc. Opportunities for conservation and use of recycled water 
are evident. However, the most important aspect of the municipal 
system is the system itself: reducing pressure, valve maintenance, 
and, above all, repair of leaks. Losses of 10 to 15 percent ofthe water 
in municipal systems is quite common. With older systems, and in 
the cities of developing countries, including those of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, losses commonly exceed 50 percent. In 
effect, the water supply system is either twice as large as need be or 
it could serve twice as many people. Identification and repair of leaks 
in the water distribution system is not cheap, but it is generally one 
of the most cost-effective ways of increasing the supply of water. 
There is little point in talking about policies for municipal 
systems. For the most part, all of the necessary tools are within the 
control of city officials. Senior levels of government can, of course, 
help by providing technical and, probably most important, financial 
assistance. Once an effort is made, savings can come quickly. 
Jerusalem cut its water use by 14 percent between 1989 and 1991 
through a combination of water-saving devices, leak repair, and 
more efficient irrigation of city parks (Postel, 1993). 
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LONGER TERM PROSPECTS FOR CHANGES IN WATER BALANCES 
Water scarcity in Israel becomes more acute when one consid- 
ers demand and supply in the context of future socio-economic and 
ecological changes that may occur. The socio-economic factor with 
the greatest potential impact is population growth; the ecological 
factor is global climate change. 
Demographic Change 
Israel's current population is approaching 4.5 million per- 
sons; population growth is 1.6 percent per year in Israel, and the 
government maintains a pro-natalist policy. Immigration of Soviet 
and Ethiopian Jews to Israel will likely increase the population over 
the next few years, if not the natural growth rate. 
The Palestinian population of the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem) and Gaza is about 1.7 million (Heller and Nusseibah, 
1991). The rate of population growth is close to 3 percent per year. 
A Palestinian state on the West Bank could draw back an additional 
750,000 to 1 million people (Ibid.), most ofthem from refugee camps 
(which currently house close to 800,000 Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). The numbers could 
increase with new conflicts within the Arab world, which provides a 
home for much of the Palestinian diaspora. 
Finally, to complete the picture, although Jordan and Syria are 
relatively lightly populated at present, growth rates of 3.8 percent are 
reported from both countries. Even present levels of population 
strain the available resources (in Jordan) or the existing infrastruc- 
ture (in Syria). Population growth can only increase pressure on 
water (and other) resources. The results ofthese rates of population 
growth are shown in Table 6. 
Combining these rates of population growth with projections 
that assume no changes in water policies, technologies or consump- 
tion patterns yield truly frightening deficits. By 2020, the existing 
Israeli water deficit of 200 to 250 Mcm per year could grow to around 
500 Mcm per year in the absence of immigration and to twice that 
figure ifone assumes an additional one million immigrants (Fishelson, 
1992). Palestinian immigration and natural population growth 
would, under these assumptions, approximately double the current 
water deficit in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of 100 Mcm per 
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TABLE 6. POPULATION DATA, SELECTED MIDDLE FAST 
COIXMIF,S, ACTIJAL 1960 - 1990, 
AND PROJF,CTF.D TO 2025 
Population Size (millions of persons) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2005 2025 
Israel 2.1 3.0 3.9 4.8 4.9 63 6.9 
Jordan 13 2.3 3.2 4.2 4.7 9.9 
Lebanon 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.0 4.7 
Syria 4.6 6.3 9.0 12.3 15.0 34.1 
Sources: World Tables, 3'd edition, 1983; World Resources, 1988-89; 
Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1992; Fishelson, 1992b. 
year. (There is a discrepency in the data on water availability in the 
West Bank. Some authors characterize the situation as a water 
deficit, while others claim there is no deficit. Unquestionably, there 
is a distributional problem, as water is not supplied to over 20 percent 
of West Bank Palestinian settlements.) 
In addition to internal deficits, problems of water supply and 
demand in Israel must be placed within the broader regional context. 
Jordan, with annual rates of per capita consumption already 25 
percent below the generally accepted "water poverty line" of 100 
litres per capita-day, is projecting a water deficit of 350 Mcm per 
year or two to two-and-a-half times this amount based on its rate of 
population growth and immigration. Syria and Lebanon are the only 
countries that could continue to expand water use for some time in 
measure with population and economic growth, though both coun- 
tries already face local shortages in urban areas. 
Deficits of the size and duration suggested above are not 
sustainable and possibly could not be supported except in an 
occasional year of high rainfall. The projections should not be 
treated as predictions, however. Their main value is to emphasize the 
impossibility ofa business-as-usual scenario and, by implication, the 
need for changes in all three: policies, technologies, and consumption 
patterns. 
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Global Climate Change 
Magnif},ing demographic pressures on the water system is the 
spectre of global climate change that could reduce the amount of 
water available to the region's rapidly growing population. 
Anthropogenic emissions of certain gases, most notably carbon 
dioxide (CO,), methane (CH), chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), nitrous 
oxides (NO) and water vapour, all contribute to a general process 
known as the "greenhouse effect," or global warming. The term 
"greenhouse gas" has been applied to atmospheric gases that are 
relatively transparent to incoming short wave solar radiation but 
which absorb the long wave radiation from the surface of the earth 
and re-emit it downward, warming the surface of the earth and the 
lower atmosphere. Emissions of these gases are increasing at a 
constant rate, primarily as a result of increased fossil fuel combus- 
tion. The focus to date has been on CO2, released from the burning 
of coal and other carbon-based fuels and from the burning and decay 
ofthe world's forests. Since 1958, when measurements of C02 in the 
atmosphere began, its concentration has increased from 315 to 353 
parts per million (ppm). A doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial 
levels -- expected sometime next century -- could result in global 
temperature increases on the order of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius (and 
much greater in the high latitude zones of the northern hemisphere). 
Concentrations of the other greenhouse gases, currently at much 
lower concentrations than CO 2, but more potent in their ability to 
promote heating and thus potentially more damaging, are increasing 
even more rapidly. CH41 which is emitted from wetlands, rice 
paddies, livestock and from warming permafrost is increasing at the 
rate of 1 percent per year (compared with 0.4 percent per year for 
carbon dioxide). CFCs have been increasing at 5 percent per year, 
although with the Montreal Protocol, which set international limits 
on the emissions of CFCs, concentrations of this gas should decrease 
over the next two decades. 
Climate warming, if it occurred, would affect the water supply 
situation in Israel in three ways (Lonergan and Kavanagh, 1991; 
Hillel, 1992). First, temperature in the region would likely increase 
between 15 percent and 30 percent over present levels. This would 
increase evaporation rates (by 5 to 20 percent), increase the amount 
of energy needed for space cooling (which would prompt a demand 
for more electrical generation, although not, necessarily, affect water 
demand or supply directly), and likely increase the demand for 
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domestic consumption for drinking water and recreational uses. 
More importantly, precipitation would likely decline (although the 
climate models are not consistent in their precipitation projections for 
the region). This would have obvious implications for the amount of 
water supplied to replenish streams and recharge aquifers. And, 
third, the variability of precipitation might change, resulting in 
longer and more severe droughts, and exacerbating the problems 
already experienced with a highly variable hydrological cycle. 
SUMMARY 
Water quantity problems in Israel are not so much ecological 
as economic in origin: from a supply perspective, there is plenty of 
water available provided you can pay for it; from a demand perspec- 
tive, the cheaper water is, the more abundantly and wastefully it will 
be used. By common agreement, the core of the problem in Israel is 
misallocation of water. Most people, and particularly farmers, pay 
too little for water. As a result, water conservation is more a slogan 
than the imperative it should be. These facts and their connection to 
declining water availability are becoming more widely known, and 
the time is likely not far in the future when permanent reallocation of 
water and new pricing structures for water will be instituted in Israel 
-- which is not to say that either will be accomplished without spilling 
a great deal of political blood and insistence on change from the 
public. 
A search for reasonable solutions to the water problems in the 
Middle East, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, must take 
into consideration the dynamic nature of the social and environmen- 
tal systems present. Very high rates of natural population increase, 
coupled with significant immigration, will further strain the water 
supply system of all countries in the region. Without basin-wide 
solutions to water problems, the level of population growth is not 
sustainable. To exacerbate the problem, there is a possibility that 
less water will be available in the future, through a combination of 
increased variability in precipitation and higher rates of evaporation. 
Climatologists now believe there will be a greater magnitude and 
frequency of "extreme events" accompanying climate warming, 
which suggests longer and more severe droughts for the region. 
59 

Economic, Ecological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Wateeln Israel 
V. WATER QUALITY: 
THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 
Waters wear the stones. 
(Job 14.19) 
The second component of Israel's water crisis is less ancient 
but equally pressing: water quality. This component is part of a 
growing environmental problem that has been described as a "sharp- 
ening struggle" by Brooks and Shadur (1991). Water quality 
problems are a compound of many factors, three of which deserve to 
be highlighted: overpumping of aquifers, pollution of water courses, 
and the limited size and protection of ecological preserves. 
OVF,RPIJMPING of AQUIFERS 
Overpumping of wells causes a decline in the water table. 
During the recent drought, when aquifers were pumped particularly 
hard, water levels in aquifers in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories were typically falling by 10 to 40 centimetres per year, a 
situation that everyone recognized to be unsustainable. 
A decline in the water table has several adverse effects. At a 
minimum, it adds to pumping costs and increases energy consump- 
tion for pumping. More importantly, a lower water table reduces 
pressure in the aquifer and permits lower quality water to flow 
inward and contaminate the fresh water of the aquifer. The Coastal 
Aquifer in its natural state is 3 to 5 metres above sea level, which, 
thanks to the force ofgravity, creates an outward pressure that blocks 
the inflow of seawater. Pumping, or more accurately over-pumping, 
has lowered the fresh water level below sea level so the effect is 
reversed and salt water from the Mediterranean can now be found one 
to three kilometres inland. (Note that this situation changed recently 
61 
Economic, Ecological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Water In Israel 
with very heavy precipitation; it is believed, however, that this is 
temporary.) This inflow magnifies the effects of using and re-using 
water for irrigation with the result that 10 percent ofthe wells tapping 
the Coastal Aquifer now produce water too salty for domestic use, 
and Israel's Hydrological Service estimates that one-fifth ofthe wells 
will soon be too salty even for agricultural irrigation (Gabbay,1992). 
If World Health Organization standards for drinking water were 
observed in Israel, many of the coastal wells would be unfit as 
sources of drinking water (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 
1991). Worse yet, intruding salty water corrodes the limy portions 
of the porous sandstones that make up the aquifer, so that they 
become blocked and are reduced in capacity or even destroyed. 
In the case ofthe Mountain Aquifer, which is the main source 
of drinking water for Israel, the problem is not seawater but nearby 
saline aquifers that can seep into the overpumped zones. Each of its 
zones contains some brackish water. Because it is composed of 
channels in limestone ("karst" structures), water (and pollutants) 
flow more quickly through the Mountain Aquifer than through 
sandstone aquifers with small pores. The Ministry of the Environ- 
ment has proposed that a Mountain Aquifer Authority be established 
along the lines ofthe Kinneret Authority, but the response to date has 
been evasive. 
WATER POLLUTION 
Israelis have made a good start at controlling air pollution, 
mainly because it was no one's responsibility, and the Ministry ofthe 
Environment (until 1988 the Environmental Protection Service) was 
able to assert control (Whitman, 1988). Not so with water, where 
the Ministries of Agriculture, of Industry, of Health and of the 
Interior are conspicuous by their support for vested interests and 
their lack of enthusiasm for defense of water quality. Dumping is 
common, sometimes directly into water courses and sometimes into 
wadis which, at the next rainfall, allow contaminants to seep into the 
aquifers. Cleaning a polluted river is difficult; cleaning a polluted 
aquifer is infinitely more so and in some cases simply not possible 
(Goldenberg and Melloul, 1992). Only in late 1991 were some ofthe 
jurisdictional issues over water resolved with the Ministry of the 
Environment receiving responsibility for toxic and hazardous sub- 
stances, pest control, and prevention of nuisances. 
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Among Israel's major water pollution problems are the fol- 
lowing: 
Agricultural Run-off 
Agricultural run-off is the major non-point source of many 
pollutants, including sediment, phosphorous, nitrogen and pesti- 
cides. Per hectare use of pesticides and fertilizer in Israel rates 
among the highest in the world, and run-off is correspondingly high. 
To date regulations on pesticide use are quite lax and all but non- 
existent on agricultural run-off. Even some irrigation water, for 
which standards can be well below those of drinking water, is now 
so contaminated with residues as to be unfit for use. For example, 
over the past two decades, nitrate concentrations in the Coastal 
Aquifer (from both fertilizers and re-use of sewage effluents) have 
doubled (Gabbay, 1992). Such problems are anything but inevita- 
ble. Practices such as conservation tillage, contour planting, terrac- 
ing and filter systems, among others, can control soil erosion and 
reduce phosphorous and nitrogen run-off by up to 60 percent (World 
Resources Institute, 1992). 
Pesticide residues are a special problem. There are no 
standards for permissible levels of pesticides in drinking water (and 
only lightly enforced ones for food consumed domestically; very 
different from food destined for export). Such tests as are made are 
held confidential and are not always made available to the public 
(Fletcher, 1991). Only occasionally do stories break into the news, 
as when the Ministry of the Environment made public its discovery 
that pesticides were being stored in water pumping stations. 
The growing use of brackish water can increase soil salinity, 
a problem that is already evident in certain parts of the country 
(Gabbay, 1992). Washing out the salts with fresh water can alleviate 
local problems but at the expense of allowing the salts to drain into 
watercourses or aquifers with potential longer term problems. Regu- 
lations have yet to be developed to deal with this problem (except for 
limitations on use of brackish water just above sensitive parts of the 
Coastal Aquifer). 
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Drinking Water and Sewage 
Piped drinking water and sewer systems are extensive through- 
out Israel, as is piped water in much of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. (Most of the water and sewage system in the refugee 
camps has been financed by United Nations agencies.) Today, 90 
percent of municipal wastewater within Israel is collected in sewers, 
and 80 percent is treated (Whitman, 1988). However, just as with 
many cities in North America, the system has begun to deteriorate. 
The Health Ministry tests extensively for bacteriological contamina- 
tion, and quality standards for drinking water were tightened in 1989. 
A small percentage of tests show excess contaminants, mainly 
because of antiquated and leaking sewage pipes in the northern part 
of the country. Older systems are being replaced, but progress is 
slow because of budget constraints. 
Not surprisingly, Israeli investment in water supply is concen- 
trated within the Green Line. Mekorot has connected towns and 
larger villages close to the Green Line and within the Gaza Strip to 
the National Water Carrier (Bruins et al, 1991). Nevertheless, 
drinking water quality is generally poorer on the West Bank and 
significantly so in the Gaza Strip where many residents routinely 
drink contaminated and/or saline water (Zarour and Isaac, 1991; 
Shawwa, 1992). Some 20 percent of West Bank villages still have 
no regular water supply (al-Khatib, 1992), and many residents are 
experiencing health problems because of inadequate (or non-exist- 
ent) sewage disposal. Israel has extended water supply lines to cover 
about 60 percent of the households of the West Bank and is now 
beginning to extend sewage lines (Sbeih, 1992). For example, a 
sewage project is being built to serve Bethlehem, Beit Sahour and 
Belt Jala in the West Bank (Zarour and Isaac, 1991). However, the 
new sewage projects come with a trade-off: Israel gets the sewage 
which it then reclaims for its own use. The same wastewater could 
make a much greater addition to output if directed to Palestinian 
farms, which are short of irrigation water (Ibid.) but which cannot 
generally afford to install the capital-intensive irrigation techniques 
that characterize Israeli agriculture. 
As noted in Section III. C.1, some 70 percent of municipal 
sewage in Israel is recycled as irrigation water. This is critical to 
Israel's water balance. However, re-use of sewage has its own 
problems; two-thirds of the re-used water receives minimal or no 
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treatment, and much of it contains excessive quantities of chemicals 
(Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1991; Gabbay, 1992). This 
creates problems for farm workers and, in some cases, for the crops. 
Chemicals 
No one knows how badly contaminated Israeli surface and 
underground water is because so few tests are done (Fletcher and 
Nordell, 1991). Spot checks have found concentrations of specific 
contaminants at levels that are a few to 100 times the allowable levels 
in other industrial countries (Muszkat, 1989, cited in Fletcher and 
Nordell, 1991). Solvents, petro-chemicals, gasoline products and 
other wastes (some of them known or suspected carcinogens) are 
routinely dumped by municipalities and industries into any nearby 
water course. For example, the Kishon River in Haifa receives 10 
thousand cubic metres daily of industrial waste water -- so much that 
parks along its banks are considered dangerous to health (Hirschberg, 
1991). Olive oil mills, an otherwise excellent way to increase the 
value added from farming and provide employment in rural areas, 
have both solid and liquid residues. The former can generally be put 
back on fields, but the latter has so high a BODS that it is generally 
just dumped. No data on the extent of this problem have been found 
for Israel, but the impact of some 40 mills in Jordan is equal to that 
of a city of one million. Contamination by heavy metals and synthetic 
organic chemicals is still reported to be low and limited to industrial 
areas, but more serious problems are expected in the future (Gabbay, 
1992). 
The Health Ministry is just now considering whether to 
establish standards on maximum levels of organic and inorganic 
compounds ("micro-pollutants") in drinking water. The Environ- 
ment Ministry has proposed regulations to deal with industrial 
dumping and is moving to establish new regulations to deal with 
toxics. Still, Israel is a long way from "polluter pays" principle. And 
the country's one official toxic waste disposal site (Ramat Hovav) is 
SBOD stands for biological oxygen demand, which is an indication of the 
oxidizing power of the waste stream. Liquid wastes with a high BOD draw all 
the oxygen from water so that other forms of life, both animal and vegetal, 
suffocate. Information about BOD content appears in written communications 
from the Royal Scientific Society in Jordan to IDRC in Ottawa. 
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so poorly designed and so limited in capacity that disposal pools 
overflow after heavy rains and contaminate nearby reservoirs 
(Whitman, 1988). Worse yet, evidence suggests that toxic wastes 
have been seeping downward into the aquifers that are vital to Israel. 
NATURF, RESERVES 
While Israel has a higher proportion of her land (about 18 
percent) in national parks and nature reserves than most other 
countries, the protected areas are inevitably quite small. Fresh water 
areas come under intense pressure, particularly during the hot 
summer months, from both domestic recreational use and interna- 
tional tourism. They are also subject to encroachment, as when an 
industrial park was proposed close to Kabri Springs (a plan that was 
blocked by legal action). 
Moreover, in its effort to assure adequate and growing sup- 
plies of water, Israel has regularly violated its usual concern with 
protection of nature and the Biblical landscape (Brooks and Shadur, 
1991). Waste now contaminates many beaches, and those near 
Herzliyyah and Netanyah, among others, are regularly closed to 
bathers during the summer. Flow in the Jordan River has been 
reduced to a fraction of its former volume. And there is a plan to dam 
(albeit for electricity rather than, directly, for water) the last free- 
flowing stretch of the Jordan River (World Rivers Review, 1991). 
Ironically, the plan is being advocated by a kibbutz. 
Despite these problems, nature preservation remains highly 
valued in Israeli politics. Growing recognition of the economic 
potential of eco-tourism adds to the forces against encroachment. 
(For example, because of its location at the junction of three 
continents, Israel is a funnel for tens of millions of birds that migrate 
south in the fall and north in the spring. Thousands of bird-watchers 
come to view the storks, pelicans, raptors and other species.) Israeli 
courts are increasingly open to legal arguments in favour of main- 
taining existing states of preservation, if not always to those for 
extending protection to new areas. What still appears to be missing 
is widespread acceptance of the ecological services of natural areas 
in protecting the quantity and quality of water outside the reserves. 
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Sow HOPEFUL SIGNS 
There are exceptions to the generally dismal picture of water 
quality in Israel. Lake Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee) has been under 
a unified management plan that prohibits dumping and restricts uses 
of water from the lake. As a result, Kinneret retains its quality, and 
its beauty. The power of Mekorot is such that it could impose similar 
restrictions on other areas of the country, but that would run head- 
on into vested interests. Even Kinneret is not fully protected from 
agriculture runoff, with one result that nitrogen content in the water, 
and thus algae, has been rising. 
Another potential exception involves the Yarkon River, which 
flows through Tel Aviv, Israel's biggest city. Coastal rivers are the 
most seriously degraded ecosystems in Israel. The Yarkon is typical. 
Only 27 kilometres long, its flow is greatly reduced because the 
springs which fed it have been diverted to the National Water Carrier. 
As a result, industrial wastewater and urban run-off are no longer 
flushed away. Now the Yarkon will serve as the test case of both 
physical and economic feasibility of reversing this situation. In late 
1988, a special authority was set up to undertake remedial activities 
and restorethe river to a condition that would permit recreational use. 
So far efforts have been mainly directed to clean-up of trash and 
debris, and restrictions on new dumping. It is too early to tell if the 
project will be successful and can be extended to other coastal rivers. 
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SUMMARY 
There is growing public demand in Israel for a reduction in 
water pollution. Israel has always had strong and widely respected 
non-government organizations in the environmental field -- most 
notably, the Society for the Preservation of Nature in Israel (better 
known simply as SPNI) -- and their work has been critical. However, 
the demand is much bigger than those groups alone. Concerns related 
to health, to preservation of limited recreational opportunities, and to 
the continuing image of a people tied to the land all play a role. 
Equally, some of the early efforts to reshape the land are now 
recognized as errors. Parts of the Hula may be restored to a wetland 
in order to protect Kinneret and prevent the spread of slow-burning 
fires that ignite spontaneously in the underlying peat as it dries and 
oxidizes. 
Difficult issues remain, as much in cleaning up older problems 
as in coping with new ones -- and in responding to demands to cut 
corners in order to, for example, mitigate housing problems or create 
jobs for new immigrants. Nevertheless, there are grounds to think 
that Israel may have turned the corner in terms of recognizing that 
water has a quality as well as a quantity dimension. 
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VI. DISTRIBUTION OF WATER: 
THE GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS 
More and more we learn (or do we?) that 
liberties, security and well-being can only be founded 
on well used lands, whose productivity is safe- 
guarded and improved from year to year and gen- 
erations to generations. But social justice... must 
also prevail. For injustices to farmers and peasants 
have in many times and places brought about the 
decay and decline of agriculture and with them 
social unrest. 
(W. C. Lowdermilk, Introduction to Reifenberg, 1955) 
Water has been integral to local and regional politics in the 
Middle East for centuries. So far as Israel is concerned, water was 
recognized by the early Zionists to be critical to the success of their 
dreams (references cited in Lowi, 1992, p. 39; see also Hosh and 
Isaac, 1992, for more recent history). Few if any of these statements 
are relevant to present concerns. A better idea of the importance of 
water to modern Israel can be taken from an incident related by Heller 
and Nusseibah (1991): 
So frightening was the spectre of future water 
diversion that in the mid-1970s a Labour government 
generally opposed to Jewish settlement in the West 
Bank nevertheless decided to establish a small number 
of settlements in Samaria, a few kilometres east ofthe 
Green Line, in order to forestall the possibility that the 
initial catchments of the western aquifer would be 
turned over to foreign control (p. 108). 
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WATER POLITI" FROM 1948 To 1967 
Prior to the 1967 War, Israel and the neighbouring Arab states 
had occasionally feuded over access to Jordan River waters. Naff 
and Matson (1984) documented a dozen water-related ceasefire 
violations in the Jordan River basin between 1951 and 1967 alone. 
On the other hand, each of the states more or less accepted the shares 
of water defined for them by the Johnston Plan in 1955 (see further 
below). The status quo appeared to be tacitly acceptable. 
Although the authors of this document do not prescribe to this 
view, some analysts have speculated that the need for more water was 
a major factor in Israel's involvement in the 1967 War. A similar 
accusation has been made for Israel's incursion into Lebanon in 
1982. Studies of the history of water and politics in the region are 
mixed on support for this contention (cf. Naff and Matson, 1984; 
Wolf, 1992; Wolf and Lonergan, 1993). Perhaps the most sensible 
statement appears in Heller and Nusseibah (1991, p. 107): "The 
development of Israel's National Water Carrier and Syrian attempts 
to divert headwaters of the Jordan River played a part in the chain of 
events leading to the Arab-Israeli war of 1967." 
It is true that, at the time, Israel was tapping all of its available 
fresh water supplies and taking more than its share of Jordan River 
water. During the war, Israeli planes destroyed a half-completed 
dam on the Yarmuk River between Syria and Jordan, and also the 
intake facilities for the East Ghor Canal along the Jordanian side of 
Jordan River valley. These structures would reduce (or would have 
reduced) flow to either the Upper or Lower Jordan Rivers and thus 
the water available for use in Israel. However, whether these attacks 
were part of a considered plans or targets of opportunity chosen in 
the midst of a war is unclear. 
WATER POIm". AFTER 1967 
Occupation by Israel ofthe West Bank and the Golan Heights 
after the 1967 War significantly changed the dimensions of water 
demand and supply in Israel. (As a water-deficit region, the Gaza 
Strip was less important in this respect.) First, it increased Israel's 
fresh water supplies by almost 50 percent. Second, it gave the 
country almost total control over the headwaters of the Jordan River 
and its tributaries, apart from the Yarmuk, as well as control over the 
major recharge region for the Mountain Aquifer. Third, while the 
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Banias River, flowing off the Golan Heights, is a relatively minor 
source for the Jordan River, control of the Heights makes Israel the 
upper riparian on the river, which has important political and legal 
implications, and which was likely part of the rationale for its 
annexation by Israel. In recent months, the new Labour Government 
in Israel has offered to return part of the Golan Heights to Syria. 
However, it is not clear to what extent the offer includes the sources 
of the Jordan River and hence to what extent it is strategic for water 
policy -- nor for that matter whether Syria is interested in any offer 
less than return of the entire territory. 
Finally, Israel solidified its position on the Yarmuk River 
(which forms the boundary between Jordan and Syrian and then joins 
the Lower Jordan River within Israel at a point just below the outlet 
from Kinneret). Israel was always a downstream riparian on the 
Yarmuk, but now, as a result of the war, it controls half of the river 
compared with 10 percent previously. This change allowed Israel to 
increase its use of Yarmuk water, and it now appears to be taking 
about 100 Mcm per year, most or all of which Jordan would like to 
regain to supplement its own very limited sources. More important, 
it made any upstream development of the Yarmuk dependent on 
Israeli consent. While secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan 
after the war permitted the latter to repair the East Ghor Canal on the 
Jordanian side of the river (Hosh and Isaac, 1992), better use could 
be made of the Yarmuk if a dam were built to store high winter flows 
-- but this requires agreement with both Syria and Israel, something 
that is unlikely in the absence of at least a limited peace agreement, 
and maybe not even then. (Syria has built 25 small dams to capture 
water draining southward the Yarmuk and would not want the value 
of these structures compromised.) More recently, according to Naff 
(1990), Israel refused to allow Jordan to dredge the entrance to the 
East Ghor Canal, which has been silting since it was re-opened two 
decades ago. By restricting the water flow out of the Yarmuk, the 
flow into the Jordan River is increased, which benefits Israel. 
Control of the West Bank and the Golan Heights thus gave 
Israel access to additional water supplies and better control over 
existing supplies. As indicated above, Israel had for many years been 
tapping aquifers that rise on the West Bank from within the Green 
Line. Since the war, the country has become acutely dependent on 
the aquifers in this region, particularly for drinking water. Almost 
immediately after the war, Israeli water policies and institutions were 
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extended to the West Bank. The effect of the extension is -- to use 
a provocative but nonetheless appropriate term -- de facto annexa- 
tion of West Bank water resources. 
In addition to direct use of water from the Mountain Aquifers 
from wells within Israel, West Bank (and Gaza) water is used to 
supply new Jewish settlements outside the boundaries of pre-1967 
Israel. Taken together, about 70 percent of the groundwater on 
which Israel is dependent, and more than 33 percent of its sustainable 
annual water supply, originate in the Occupied Palestinian Territo- 
ries, mainly in its aquifers. Such figures make it easier to understand 
(though not accept) the declarations of former Agriculture Minister 
Rafael Eitan (perhaps the most outspoken politician on the issue) that 
relinquishing control over water supplies in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories would "threaten the Jewish state." 
Zarour and Isaac (1991, 1992), together with other analysts, 
provide figures (see table 7) that allow one to make rough compari- 
sons of daily water use per capita within Israel proper and by various 
aggregations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (100 litres per 
capita-day is generally taken as the minimum for adequate health and 
sanitation). 
TABLE 7. SELECTED DATA ON WATER USF. IN ISRAEL AND 
THF, OCCUPIF,D PALESTINIAN TERRTToRIES 
Litres of Water for Percentage of 
Domestic Use, per Cultivated Land that 
Location capita, per day is Irrigated 
Israel (within 
125 47 
the green line) 
West Bank 5 
Villages 40 
Towns 100 
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In their view, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territo- 
ries are entitled to at least one-quarter of the water resources of the 
region. They are now getting between one-twelfth and one-sixth. 
A POTENTIAL, SURPLUS ON THE WEST BANK 
The salient fact about water on the West Bank is that only 
about 15 percent (125 Mcm) of the total surface and underground 
supply goes to the people who have historically lived there. Of water 
from the Territories themselves, Israel pumps some 300 to 350 Mcm 
per year, with another 40 - 50 Mcm or so being extracted on the West 
Bank and going directly to Israeli settlements. Arab communities 
and farmers get about 54 Mcm per year, or about one-third of their 
total use from wells. The remaining two-thirds comes from river 
water, springs, and cisterns that collect run-off(Heller and Nusseibah, 
1991; Zarour and Isaac, 1991). In short, only a small portion of 
aquifer water goes to Palestinians living on the West Bank, with the 
result that consumption in the more than 100 Jewish settlements is 
nearly half that of the entire Palestinian population. (These figures 
appear to be an accurate assessment of current water use on the West 
Bank. Lowi's (1991) claim that water use in the Israeli settlements 
is approaching that of the entire Palestinian population probably 
refers to well water alone.) 
All water developments in the West Bank are carefully 
controlled by the Israeli Military Authority, working in collaboration 
with the Water Commission, which, as was noted above, reports to 
the Minister of Agriculture. Policies applied to Arab communities 
and farms on the West Bank are highly discriminatory (Lowi,1992). 
For example: 
-No Palestinian Arab individual or village has received per- 
mission to drill a new well for agricultural purposes since integration, 
nor even to repair one that happens to be close to an Israeli well. 
Some permits are granted to obtain water for domestic use. 
-Palestinians are only allowed to drill shallow wells, 70 metres 
or so. In contrast, Mekorot prefers to drill to depths of 300 to 400 
metres in order to get higher flow rates and better quality water. 
Mekorot wells each yield about 750 thousand cubic metres per year, 
while the Palestinian wells yield only 13 thousand (Heller and 
Nusseibah, 1991). In some cases, the deeper wells drain water from 
the shallower ones. 
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-Water allocations recognize only existing uses of water, 
which, so far as Arab agriculture is concerned, are those of 1968, and 
allocations are frozen at the 1968 level with only a small margin for 
growth. 
-West Bank Arabs are not allowed to use water in farming 
after 4:00 p.m., despite the fact that evening is the traditional (and 
sensible) time to irrigate in and regions. 
-Reforestation is prohibited in the recharge areas of the 
aquifer, except on private plots, in order to promote maximum runoff 
and thus recharging of the aquifer. 
These regulations are particularly severe because of the 
dependence of the West Bank on agriculture, and of agriculture on 
water. More than 85 percent of water used in the region is for 
irrigation (Zarour and Isaac, 1991). To compound the discrimina- 
tion, Jewish settlements receive heavy subsidies for water in order to 
promote extension of agriculture. Naff (1990) calculates that the 
typical Israeli settler farms 50 hectares and irrigates for 250 days a 
year. He pays $0.10 per cubic metre for water that costs $0.34, with 
the total subsidy cumulating to $29,500 (1988 US dollars) per year. 
In contrast, West Bank Palestinians receive no subsidy at all. 
Roughly, Palestinian farmers pay for irrigation water what settlers 
pay for drinking water. Water supplied by local Arab authorities 
may be still more expensive, as high as $1.20 per cubic metre (Zarour 
and Isaac, 1992). Given that per capita income on the West Bank is 
only about one-fifth of that in Israel (and in the Gaza Strip even 
lower), the need for economic growth is self evident. 
These (andother) discriminatory practices are enforcedthrough 
the application of Israeli law to the West Bank. According to Zarour 
and Isaac (1991), "Although the new legislation conforms to the 
Israeli water law, it is not consistent with the rights of an occupying 
power under international law." Clearly, the dispute is in effect over 
sovereignty, not just over the division of water supplies. 
Disturbing as this system is, it is important not to exaggerate. 
The issue is one of economic development, not of thirst. Water 
Commissioner Meir Ben Meir stated the issue starkly: "If the 
demand is for drinking, we must say `yes'; we do say `yes'. But we 
are not going to stop irrigating our orchards so they can plant new 
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ones." This position appears to be consistent with international law. 
Baskin (1992, p. 6) notes that, "International law on belligerent 
occupation ... only demands that the domestic water needs (home 
use) be accounted for. Industrial and agricultural development are 
beyond the definitions of the accepted international law." This does 
not mean that water supply has kept growth with population; since 
1967, water allocations for domestic use have been increased by 
about 20 percent while population in the West Bank has grown by 84 
percent (Baskin, 1992). However, it does mean that the principal 
concern is not that Palestinians will have insufficient water for 
household use; rather it is that they will have insufficient water to 
establish a viable economy. 
The need for West Bank water in Israel and, therefore, its 
dependency on this resource is hotly contested. Former Water 
Commissioner Tsemach Yisahi agrees with Rafael Eitan and claims 
that Israel must hold onto the West Bank "to make sure that Tel 
Aviv's taps don't run dry." On the other hand, Gideon Fishelson of 
the Hammer Institute (University of Tel Aviv) argues that with more 
rational policies in Israel, there would be no need for West Bank 
water. Similarly, Arie Issar (Professor of Water Resources at the 
Blaustein Institute) says there is more to be gained in sharing than 
hoarding water resources (cited in Pearce, 1991b). Tahal seems to 
be coming to the same position. According to the Israeli newspaper 
Ha-Aretz (10 March, 1992), Tahal prepared a report that indicates 
how Israel could withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
without jeopardizing its security of water supply. Unfortunately, 
military censors classified the document as secret at the request ofthe 
Minister of Agriculture. 
Some analysts find that there could be a surplus of water on 
the West Bank. Zarour and Isaac (1991) indicate that the "water 
potential" for conventional sources of water is 850 Mcm per year, of 
which 620 Mcm is "easily available," which presumably means at 
moderate capital costs. This conforms closely to the figure from 
Heller and Nusseibah (1991) who state that aquifers wholly or partly 
located under the West Bank have a renewable flow of 615 Mcm per 
year. As indicated above, Israeli wells within the Green Line take 
about half of this; Israeli wells to supply settlements account for 
another 40 Mcm; and Palestinian wells for another 50 Mcm. Thus, 
both Zarour and Isaac (1991) and Heller and Nusseibah (1991) 
conclude the West Bank has a water surplus of about 200 Mcm per 
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year, even excluding the water that is drawn from the nearly 300 
springs in the area and by cisterns and tanks that hold rainwater and 
runoff. The implication is that there is considerable room for 
expansion of irrigated agriculture on the West Bank while still 
providing for industrial and population growth. 
Not everyone agrees with the foregoing analysis. Starr and 
Stoll (1988) state that water in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
is currently being exploited to its limit. And Naff (1990) states that 
the water of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is being over- 
exploited at a rate of 150 Mcm per year. (Both statements presum- 
ably include the Gaza Strip, but elsewhere in the same document Naff 
says the deficit in Gaza is 70 Mcm, so that in the West Bank must be 
80 Mcm.) These conclusions may have been based on earlier data 
before hydrological studies indicated the full extent of West Bank 
water resources. However, Shuval (1992), who is fully aware of 
these data, concludes that the entire region is already, or soon will be, 
short of water, and that the only solution is to bring in additional 
sources of water from outside the region in a "Regional Water-for- 
Peace Plan." (The kinds of options recommended by Shuval will be 
discussed in Chapter VII.) Most Israelis attending the First Israeli- 
Palestinian International Academic Conference on Water held in 
Zurich in December of 1992 seemed to agree with Shuval. Palestin- 
ians were more cautious and argued that, were the distribution of 
water resources equitable, and were they able to manage these 
resources themselves, the West Bank could get along without 
additional supplies of water. 
For the next few years, the volume of water resources poten- 
tially available to the West Bank is probably less important than the 
capital requirements for needed expansion ofwater supply and water 
delivery systems. High capital costs are the reason why such systems 
were avoided in the past, when water shortages were perennial. Even 
today water shortages persist in some parts of the West Bank. 
Farmers and communities with inadequate capital have to rely 
mainly on springs and shallow wells (supplemented by river water 
and storage of run-off in cisterns). Lack of access to capital -- or, 
more accurately, lack of access to capital at reasonable interest rates 
-- is also the reason that Palestinian farmers have used and continue 
to use inefficient irrigation methods. 
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A DEFICIT IN THE GA7A STRIP 
The water balance in the Gaza Strip is much worse than that 
on the West Bank. The region is in deficit with the current 
population, and its economic development is well short of what 
would be necessary for adequate standards of living, and even shorter 
of that necessary for improving quality of life. According to a Dutch 
government report, Mekorot is supplying water to much of the area, 
including the towns, larger villages and certain refugee camps, 
through the National Water Carrier (Bruins et al, 1991). However, 
it is not clear whether Israel is actually supplying water to the Gaza 
Strip or is simply putting Gaza water into the Carrier. The situation 
is complicated because Israeli wells to the east ofthe Gaza Strip have 
apparently withdrawn water that would otherwise have flowed 
westward through the aquifer underlying the region. On the other 
hand, some Israeli hydrologists argue that overpumping of the 
aquifer predates the occupation and that new regulations have 
prevented an even worse situation. 
What is clear is that the situation in the Gaza Strip is desperate 
from both quantity and quality perspectives. In the small but heavily 
populated territory, a good proportion of residents are already 
drinking contaminated and/or saline water (Zarour and Isaac, 1991; 
Shawwa, 1992). The shallow aquifers that underlie the Strip, one 
sweet and one saline, are both being overpumped, mainly for 
agricultural purposes; some 98 percent of all boreholes provide 
irrigation water. Israeli officials do not permit the drilling of more 
wells for irrigation (new wells are permitted for drinking water), but 
water levels continue to fall by 15 to 20 centimetres per year. 
Conditions in the Gaza Strip appear are an example of what 
happens when all four types ofwater stress identified by Falkenmark 
et al (1989) overlap. Any reasonable resolution to the problem must 
include transfers of water from Israel. In these circumstances, it is 
hardly surprising that Israeli water policy for Gaza is different from 
its policy for the West Bank. Israeli policies and institutions were not 
extended to the Gaza Strip, as they were on the West Bank. Rather, 
old Jordanian Law No. 40 on soil and water is administered by the 
military authorities (Bruins et al, 1991). However, just as on the 
West Bank, Palestinians and Israelis tend to have sharply different 
prescriptions for dealing with the problem. Many Israeli analysts 
argue that the situation is so severe that immediate construction of 
new pipelines or desalination plants is appropriate. Palestinians are 
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sceptical of this megaproject approach in part for fear that they will 
get stuck with expensive sources of supply and in part because it 
diverts attention from the inequity of distribution of existing sup- 
plies. Almost needless to say, here too the difference in approach also 
incorporates differing views about sovereignty over land and water 
resources. 
PRETENSIONS To THF, LrrANI RIVER 
Although not connected to the Occupied PalestinianTerritories, 
Israel's incursion into Lebanon and the establishment of the "Secu- 
rity Zone" in the early 1980s allows it access to the lower reaches of 
the Litam River (which flows within 10 km of the Israeli border). 
These actions, coupled with past unsuccessful attempts by Israel to 
reach an agreement with Lebanon to share Litam water, have led to 
great Arab concern that Israel will unilaterally divert the Litam into 
the Jordan River. Certainly the value of the Litam was recognized 
by Zionist planners (Lowi, 1992), and the traditional (and current) 
Israeli position is that the Litani is actually part of the Jordan River 
watershed. Also, more rainfalls over the Litam than any other river 
in the region, and its flow is approximately 700 Mcm annually. Flow 
of the Litam at the lower end, however, is only 100 Mcm (Kolars, 
1992). The fact that Litani water is very high in quality with a salt 
content of below 250 ppm only enhances its value -- and the perceived 
threat. 
It seems unlikely, however, that Israel would attempt a 
diversion of the Litam without an explicit agreement with Lebanon. 
The Litani River lies entirely within the boundaries of what is 
internationally recognized as the borders of Lebanon (Figure 2). The 
government of Lebanon originally placed great priority on develop- 
ment ofthe river for the generation of electricity, and the construction 
of irrigation systems has largely been delayed because hydroelectric 
facilities were more profitable (Naff and Matson, 1984). If the 
political situation in Lebanon stabilizes, agricultural, industrial and 
population demands could place more pressure on water resources. 
Given current conditions, however, the continued high quality of the 
Litam will probably be maintained and demand will not reach 
unmanageable levels for some time (Naffand Matson, 1984). Still, 
Lebanon remains dependent on the Litam as a source of water, and 
if the state is to prosper it must continue to develop and harness the 
resources of the river. 
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Despite unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, the best 
evidence indicates that there have been no Israeli withdrawals of 
water from the Litam River to date, nor even construction of 
infrastructure to facilitate such withdrawal (Wolf, 1992). Occa- 
sional articles in the Arab press, and some in the United States 
claiming such withdrawals (e.g., Naff, 1990) appear to be in error. 
This does not mean that some Israelis do not covet the river. It is the 
only source that would allow Israel to maintain its present consump- 
tion rates and avoid the difficult choice to reallocate water away from 
agriculture. Lebanese analysts now believe that the Litam can (and 
should) be fully utilized for economic development within Lebanon 
itself (Kubursi and Amery, 1992), and it is unlikely to play a role in 
the future Israeli water balance. 
WATER AS A SECURTII' ISSUE 
...environmental degradation imperils na- 
tions' most fundamental aspect of security by un- 
dermining the natural support systems on which all 
of human activity depends. 
Because environmental degradation and pol- 
lution respect no human-drawn borders, they jeop- 
ardize not only the security of the country in which 
they occur, but also that of others, near and far. 
(Renner, 1989) 
It is undeniable that there have been conflicts over water 
resources involving Israel and its neighbours over the past 45 years. 
While the reasons for violent confrontations defy simple explanation, 
it is increasingly acknowledged that, in the complex web of causality 
of war, environmental factors are often a key feature (Myers, 1986; 
Russett, 1982; Westing, 1986; Homer-Dixon, 1991). Ullman 
(1983) notes that the root of most violent conflicts in history was 
competition for territory and resources, and that the conflict over 
resources is likely to become more intense as the demand for essential 
commodities increases and supply appears more precarious. All 
nations require a continuous supply of food, water, fuel and raw 
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materials, and the need for assured access to these resources provides 
a powerful driving force toward conflict. In addition, so long as the 
concept of national sovereignty remains sacrosanct, a state's resort 
to arms to retain control of its own natural resources or to protect its 
access to extraterritorial sources will remain a frequent means of 
conflict resolution (Westing, 1988). 
The concept of environmental or ecological security is now 
emerging and, while an established definition does not yet exist, the 
idea is evolving quite rapidly (Schrijver, 1989; Homer-Dixon, 
1991). There is also a growing recognition that comprehensive 
human security has two components, one political and the other 
environmental. Neither ofthese components is attainable or sustain- 
able unless the other is satisfied, and the fact that national security 
relates to such factors as watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic 
resources and climate is less often overlooked now than it was in the 
past (Westing, 1989). 
Israel's application of restrictions on Palestinian development 
and use of water not only improves its access to West Bank water, 
but also extends its control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
This increases resentment and adds to the potential for conflict in the 
area. Arabs in the West Bank have protested for years to Israeli 
authorities that their agriculture and economy are being retarded or 
even ruined by unfair water policies, and that the water network 
supplying the Jewish settlements has drastically depleted the vil- 
lages' water resources. However, the Palestinians have been frus- 
trated in their efforts to change their circumstances and, given no 
power, they can only watch their wells dry up and turn saline while 
water is diverted to Israel. While some ofthe Palestinian charges are 
disputed (see Appendix 1), the issue is a highly emotional one, and a 
number of authors have used the metaphor that the water situation in 
the Occupied Palesintian Territories is a "time bomb waiting to 
explode." 
THF, CiJRRENT MwTIAmNs 
Officially, little has happened to resolve water issues since 
1967. Unofficially, Israel and Jordan have been meeting at "picnic 
table summits" to discuss joint water concerns; for example, Israel 
has apparently allowed some dredging of the East Ghor Canal. 
However, it is unclear what of lasting consequence has been accom- 
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plished at these meetings. The Israelis feel they are a major step 
towards inter-basin cooperation, while the Jordanians note that they 
are of little use and have had no effect on Israeli behaviour relative 
to water. Clearly, Israel and her neighbours have quite different 
approaches to negotiations over water. 
These differing views are evident in the current multilateral 
talks over water that are carried on in parallel with the higher profile 
bilateral Middle East peace talks. In these discussions, Israel focuses 
on "low politics," that is, they emphasize that, whatever other 
conditions obtain, there is a great deal to be gained pragmatically by 
joint management of shared water resources in order to realize 
limited but significant gains in efficiency and welfare (Rothman and 
Lowi, 1992; Lowi, forthcoming in 1993). The Palestinians (and the 
Jordanians) in contrast focus on "high politics;" that is, they empha- 
size the need for overall peace agreements and strategic management 
of people and economic development before resolution of tactical 
water issues. 
Some analysts see ulterior motives in the "functionalist" 
Israeli approach. Zarour and Isaac (1991) suggest that Israel uses 
the water issue so as to be able to keep talking without really resolving 
anything. Rothman and Lowi (1992) tend to agree that functionalist 
low politics are inadequate in the case of intense, protracted and 
culture-laden conflicts. Elsewhere, Lowi (forthcoming, 1993) has 
argued that what surfaces as a dispute among riparians takes on the 
attributes of the greater conflict, and that therefore the riparian 
dispute cannot be resolved or even much mitigated in the absence of 
some sort of ideological consensus, which in this case would have to 
involve the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 
However, water is so essential to life that it can promote 
cooperation as easily as conflict. Even in the absence of consensus 
on high political issues, there may be benefits to be obtained from 
cooperation on water management and supply. Thus, Rothman and 
Lowi go on to suggest that, with the parallel bilateral and multilateral 
tracks of the current peace process, we may at last be witnessing the 
"iterative process by which progress beginning at the political 
process -- that is, the Arab-Israeli peace process -- requires concrete 
progress at the practical level -- for example, sharing water resources 
-- for both consolidation and fruition" (1992, p. 69). Shuval, a 
hydrologist rather than a political scientist, comes to the same 
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conclusion from a different perspective: "Just because the situation 
is so desperate, the partners to the dispute may finally realize that 
only by joining hands in a cooperative effort can they survive" (1992, 
p. 143). 
Security of water resources is a major objective of all coun- 
tries, but hydrology, economics and politics combine to make it 
particularly important to those in the Middle East. The options 
presented in the next chapter must be assessed both in terms of long- 
term environmental and demographic change occurring in the region, 
and in terms of how they affect security of water supply to Israelis 
and to Palestinians. 
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VII. REGIONAL OPTIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE 
One of the paradoxical qualities of hydro- 
political problems is that, despite their complexities 
and stubbornness, they exhibit a tendency in certain 
circumstances to encourage negotiations where other 
problems would degenerate into conflict. There is 
an underlying superordinate interest common to all 
ripanans -- water is essential to life -- that some- 
times can be made to override discords and produce 
agreements on water issues. 
(Naff, 1990, p. 158.) 
There are numerous strategies available to Israel to deal with 
its water crisis. Some are complementary; others mutually exclu- 
sive; and all are limited by economic, social or political constraints. 
Previous chapters have focused mainly on options that are available 
for Israel to undertake on its own. This chapter focuses on regional 
options. The first section below offers a brief review of relevant 
international law and of suggestive Canadian experience with inter- 
jurisdictional agreements for water. It then goes on to review a 
number of options, including agreements for sharing water; regional 
sales of water; long-distance importation of water; and militarization 
(with or without annexation) to acquire additional supplies. (The last 
in the list, militarization, should not be viewed as an "option," but as 
a possible result if all other approaches are unsuccessful.) The 
chapter concludes with discussion of an alternative approach to 
water planning. 
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INTERNATIONAL, LAW OF SHARED WATER RESOURCFS 
In 1959, Israel adopted its first comprehensive water legisla- 
tion, which declared that water resources were public property, 
subject to control by the state, and to be used by residents of the state 
for the purpose of development of the country (Teclaff, 1985). This 
legislation included all water resources, both surface and subsur- 
face, as well as drainage and sewage water. While no individual or 
group could own water (or have exclusive right to its use), the 
legislation guaranteed that everyone had the right to receive water. 
Domestic use, agriculture, industry, handicraft and commerce, and 
public services were explicitly recognized as legitimate uses. All 
licensing of water use was made by the Water Commissioner, and all 
water management was to be administered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Water Commissioner. 
This legislation was adopted in the context of ongoing discus- 
sions on the international law dealing with transboundary waters. 
International law in this area, however, has been largely ineffective, 
since any legal obligation has been based only on general principles, 
and, as Caponera (1985) notes, the real difficulties in water resource 
management concern the political willingness of states to enter into 
formal cooperative arrangements regarding water resources. 
Surface Water 
Historically, conflict over the use of water resources has 
stemmed from the adoption of one of two principles of sovereignty 
over water by riparian states. In general, upstream states have 
preferred the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, whereby a 
state has the exclusive right to use and dispose of international waters 
which flow through its territory. Alternatively, absolute territorial 
integrity, the preferred principle for downstream riparians, implies 
that downstream users are to be provided with unaltered water 
volume and quality. However, the rule of law dealing with the non- 
navigable use of water resources has most recently been based on 
general principles and recommendations arising out of United Na- 
tions rulings or on past principles used by states within water basins 
or systems. Although no general rule of international law exists, two 
principles are commonly accepted: 
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(1) Common water resources are to be shared equitably among 
the states entitled to use them, with related principles of 
(a) limited sovereignty; 
(b) duty to cooperate in development; and 
(c) protection of common resources. 
(2) States are responsible for substantial transboundary injury 
originating in their respective territories. (Caponera, 1985; 
Teclaff, 1968, 1985). 
Historically, international relations on the use and develop- 
ment of water resources were based on navigation. Significant 
consumption for multiple uses in the last half century has resulted in 
numerous conflicts over international river basins and has stimulated 
a need for laws which adequately cover transboundary water use. 
Gleick (1991) has noted in almost 50 countries the percentage ofland 
which falls in international river basins is greater than 75 percent. In 
addition, 13 major rivers have five or more riparian states. This has 
resulted in major recent conflicts on the Danube, Indus, Ganges, 
Euphrates, Jordan, Plata, and Nile Rivers. 
In 1966, the International Law Association adopted the 
"Helsinki Rules", which provided general guidelines for water 
resource use on the basis of watershed boundaries. More recent UN 
documents (e.g., UN, 1983) have adopted the use of a watercourse 
system to describe the water resources shared by many states not 
simply as a physical unit, but as a system that connects to other 
components and resources. 
The key article of the Helsinki Rules of 1966 is Article IV, 
which states that, "Each basin State is entitled within its territory to 
a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses ofthe waters 
of an international drainage basin." This principle was further 
described in an International Law Commission Report in 1983 (ILC, 
1983): 
An international watercourse system and its 
waters shall be developed, used, and shared by 
system States in a reasonable and equitable man- 
ner on the basis of good faith and good neighbourly 
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relations with a view to attaining optimum utiliza- 
tion thereof consistent with adequate protection and 
control of the watercourse system and its compo- 
nents. 
Determining what is "reasonable and equitable," of course, is 
the relevant question. What is reasonable depends on the natural 
features of a given watercourse, while equity depends on the social, 
economic and political context. The Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the 
ILC Report of 1983 detail the list offactors that should be considered 
in determining what is "reasonable and equitable" (Table 8). While 
reasonableness and equity cannot be considered rules of law, as 
Caponera (1985) notes, they do amount to a rejection ofthe principle 
of absolute territorial sovereignty of a state over international water 
resources which may flow through its country. Additionally, these 
two sets of rules also amount to a rejection ofthe concept of absolute 
territorial integrity. 
The implication of these rules is that states bordering an 
international watercourse have the duty to cooperate to ensure the 
long-term future of these water resources. This duty includes the 
protection of both the quantity of water as well as the quality of the 
water for other riparians. States must also account for any activities 
which adversely affect the interests or rights of other states. This 
duty was stated explicitly in a 1974 resolution of the UN General 
Assembly on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
It states: 
In the exploitation ofnatural resources shared 
by two or more countries, each State must cooper- 
ate on the basis of a system of information and prior 
consultation in order to achieve optimum use of 
such resources without causing damage to the 
legitimate interest of others ...all States have the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. 
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TABLE 8. THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLENESS AND EQUITY, 
ACCORDING TO THE HELSINKI RULES OF 1966 AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION (1983). 
( ADAPTED FROM CAPONERA, 1985) 
According to the Helsinki Rules (ILA, 1966): 
(1) What is reasonable and equitable share ...is to be deter- 
mined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular 
case. 
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but 
are not limited to: 
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the 
extent of the drainage area in the territory of each 
basin State; 
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the 
contribution of water by each basin State; 
(c) the climate affecting the basin; 
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in 
particular existing utilization; 
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in 
each basin State; 
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying 
the social and economic needs of each basin State; 
(h) the availability of other resources; 
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the use of waters; 
(j) the practicability of compensation as a means of adjusting 
conflicts among users; and 
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be 
satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a 
co-basin State. 
continued on page 88 
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TABLE 8. CONTINUED 
According to the ILC Report of 1983 (ILC, 1983): 
1. In determining whether the use by a system State of a 
watercourse system or its waters is exercised in a reasonable and 
equitable manner in accordance with article 7, all relevant factors shall 
be taken into account whether they are of a general nature or specific 
for the watercourse system concerned. Among such factors are: 
(a) the geographic, hydrographic, hydrological and climatic 
factors together with other relevant circumstances 
pertaining to the watercourse system concerned; 
(b) the special needs of the system State concerned for the 
use or uses in question in comparison with the needs 
of other system States including the stage of 
economic development of all system States concerned; 
(c) the contribution by the system State concerned of waters to 
the system in comparison with that of other system 
States; 
(d) development and conservation by the system States 
concerned with the watercourse system and its waters; 
(e) the other uses of a watercourse system and its waters by the 
State concerned in comparison with the uses by other 
system States, including the efficiency of such uses; 
(fl cooperation with other system States in projects or 
programmes to attain optimum utilization, protection 
and control of the watercourse system and its waters; 
(g) the pollution by the system State in question of the water 
course system in general and as a consequence of the 
particular use, if any; 
(h) other interference with or adverse effects, if any, of such 
use for the uses or interests of other States including 
but not restricted to, the adverse effects upon existing 
uses by such States of the watercourse system or its 
waters and the impact upon protection and control 
measures of other system States; and 
(i) availability to the State concerned and to other system 
States of alternative water resources. 
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Underground Water 
The distribution of fresh water on the Earth readily justifies 
the emphasis on groundwater concerns internationally; 77.2% of 
freshwater is found in ice, 22.4% in groundwater, 0.36% in surface 
water and 0.04% in gas in the atmosphere. International law for 
groundwater, however, is both more and less developed than that for 
surface water. It is less developed in the sense that it came to be an 
issue much later in the history of international law for shared natural 
resources, but it is more developed in the sense that, partly because 
of that lag, there has been systematic thinking about a technically and 
legally adequate regime for international groundwater resources. 
However, only since the Helsinki Rules of 1966 has groundwater 
been formally included within the scope of legal discussions about 
international drainage basins (Havton and Utton, 1989). 
In one way it is strange that the development of international 
law for groundwater has lagged so badly. More than 60 times as 
much fresh water occurs underground as occurs in lakes and rivers 
(Pearse, et al, 1985), and many industrial countries depend heavily 
upon groundwater -- three-fourths of all the water used in Denmark 
and the Netherlands, and nine-tenths ofthat in Belgium, is groundwater 
(Hayton and Utton, 1989). (The situation in Canada is quite 
different; only about 4 percent of our water comes from underground 
sources.) 
No less than surface sources is groundwater inclined to stay 
within a political boundary. The Disi Aquifer underlies Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia, and contains an enormous quantity of nonrenewable 
fossil water. It is heavily pumped (1600 Mcm per year, with lion's 
share going to Saudi Arabia); the water is currently used for 
irrigation as the aquifer does not occur near population centres. 
However, despite huge capital costs and high pumping costs, the 
water may eventually be piped to Amman, some 300 km from and 
1000 m above the wells. The Northeast African Aquifer underlies 
parts of Chad, Sudan, Libya and Egypt, and is being affected by the 
Libyan project to build a 1600-kilometre canal from an oasis in the 
southern part of the country to the coast. In short, only the specific 
political problems make the situation between Israel and the West 
Bank unique. 
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The general principles of management for political entities 
sharing groundwater resources are similar to those for surface water. 
As expressed by Barberis (1991, p. 167), they are: 
"... the obligation not to cause appreciable 
harm to shared resources, the duty of equitable and 
reasonable use, the obligation of prior notification, 
and the duty to negotiate." 
Barber's also points out that, even in the absence of accepted law 
for groundwater, there is a more than 100-year history of the 
successful application of these principles. However, optimum 
management can become highly complex when it is not just a 
question of trans-boundary groundwater but also of interactions 
between groundwater and surface water or of political boundaries 
between the location of the aquifer outflow and its recharge area, 
exactly the case ofthe Mountain Aquifer in Israel and the West Bank. 
The most significant new development in the international law 
of aquifers is a draft treaty developed over eight years by an 
international group of specialists (Hayton and Utton, 1989. The 
Bellagio Draft Treaty focuses on mutual agreement among those 
entities that share the aquifer and is remarkably comprehensive. 
Besides the obvious areas of withdrawal and recharge, it includes 
articles dealing with contamination, depletion, and transboundary 
transfers. Special provisions are made for drought conditions, 
including equitable sharing of any hardships; for public participa- 
tion; and for a series of dispute-resolution techniques up to and 
including formal arbitration or submission to the International Court 
of Justice. 
Might such a treaty work for Israelis and Palestinians? 
Certainly, they each have more to gain (Palestinians in the near term; 
Israelis in the long) by coming to agreement than by taking unilateral 
action. Moreover, the treaty is designed expressly to minimize 
interference with national actions. It is worth quoting at length from 
the Hayton-Utton description of the approach taken in the Bellagio 
Draft Treaty: 
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In order to minimize the intrusion into the 
sovereign sensitivities of independent countries, 
three concepts are used: 
1. rather than comprehensive administration 
along the entire border, control is to be asserted only 
in zones considered to be critical because withdraw- 
als are exceeding recharge or contamination is 
threatening groundwater quality; 
2. actual enforcement would be left to the 
internal administrative agencies of each country 
with oversight and facilitating responsibility lodged 
in an international agency; and 
3. the `black letter' provisions delegate only a 
limited amount of substantive discretion to the joint 
agency, but, above all, they instruct the Commis- 
sion to take the initiative, subject to Governments' 
approval, in preparing for and confronting the full 
range of problems involving the Parties' 
transboundarygroundwaters. (Hayton-Utton,1989, 
pp. 664-65) 
This approach seems reasonably likely to satisfy those who will 
sooner or later be faced with negotiating an agreement on sharing the 
aquifers that underlie Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territo- 
ries. 
Relevant International and Canadian Experiences 
There have been numerous experiences internationally with 
the application of water law and the development of insitutional 
frameworks and formal cooperative arrangements regarding 
transboundary water resources. Four of these are discussed below, 
primarily to provide context of the range of agreements that have 
been implemented. Two of these involve Canada, and one is solely 
within the country (the Prarie Provinces Water Board). Since the 
Canadian provinces have ownership over resources within their 
boundaries, the interjurisdictional water issue in Canada is much like 
91 
Economic, Ecological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Water In Israel 
dealing with an international river basin. These examples represent 
the types of institutional arrangements which may be appropriate in 
the Middle East. 
International Joint Commission (IJC): The International 
Joint Commission is a permanent, impartial tribunal consisting of six 
members, three from the U. S. and three from Canada. It was 
established as an institutional mechanism under the 1909 Boundary 
Waters Treaty between the two countries which set out to bring about 
rational water management of the transboundary waters. The IJC 
attends to three basic functions. First, it sits as a regulatory body that 
manages the levels and flows ofboundary and transboundary waters. 
Second, it is a commission of inquiry, to monitor, investigate and 
report on problems along the common frontier between the U.S. and 
Canada. And, third, it serves as a court of arbitration, providing 
principles for the equitable uses of boundary waters. The role of the 
IJC is similar to the UN Security Council and GATT, in that it 
arbitrates disputes between the two countries and has the power to 
prescribe conditions and provide protection from indemnity for 
injuries arising from the action of one of the two parties on the other. 
The Commission, however, has no policing powers and hence cannot 
actively enforce its decisions, and must draw on other institutional 
means for enforcement. 
The Prarie Provinces Water Board (PPWB): The Prarie 
Provinces Water Board is the administering agency for a cooperative 
surface water apportionment agreement among three provinces in 
Canada: Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. This agreement 
represents the only interjurisdictional apportionment agreement in 
Canada, and it serves as a useful model of the type of agreement that 
could be signed in the Jordan River Basin. The agreement specifies 
the "reasonable and equitable" apportionment of river waters by 
alloting provinces 50 percent ofthe natural flow arising in or flowing 
through an upstream province, thereby balancing the concepts of 
territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. All water diversions 
and consumptive uses come under the agreement. The weaknesses 
of the agreement are twofold: it allows provinces unilaterally to pass 
legislation that would exempt that province; and actions are only 
taken with the agreement of all parties. Its strength, however, is that 
it establishes a regional authority with the ability to resolve 
interjurisdictional disputes. 
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The Mekong Committee: The Mekong Committee was 
established in 1957 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic Committee for the Far East and Asia, as an independent 
body, to formulate a comprehensive plan for the development of the 
Lower Mekong. The Committee is comprised of the four riparian 
countries (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand) along with the 
assistance of 21 other nations and 12 international agencies. The 
primary goal of the Committee is to promote the "comprehensive 
development of water resources and related resources of the lower 
Mekong basin." Despite the difficult political situation in the region 
over the last two decades, the Committee has acted to develop an 
integrated planning approach to the Mekong, and recently has 
concentrated on hydroelectric development. The effectiveness ofthe 
Committee has been largely undermined by political problems and 
distrust, and it has been criticized for not responding to democratic 
and environmental criticism. Nevertheless, it appears the Committee 
will play an important role in river basin planning over the next few 
decades. 
The Joint Rivers Commission (JRC): After Bangladesh's 
independence in 1972, a 25 year "friendship treaty" was signed with 
India. One ofthe articles in the treaty incorporated water issues, such 
as river basin development, flood control and hydro-electric power 
generation. Soon after, a Joint Rivers Commission was established 
to promote development of the GangesBrahmaputra basin. The 
mandate of the JRC was limited to project development, and ex- 
cluded the question of water sharing or policy development. Al- 
though it represented the first formal forum in which bilateral 
technical discussions over water were held, the political nature ofthe 
Commission, disagreement over shared information, and the dispute 
over water sharing have limited the utility of the JRC in resolving 
transboundary water conflicts in the region. 
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REGIONAL, OPTIONS WORTH CONSIDERING 
Agreements to Share Water 
In 1948, the first formal Israeli plan to develop the Jordan 
Valley's water resources, known as the Hays Plan, was developed, 
and entitled, "TVA on the Jordan, Proposals for Irrigation and 
Hydro-Electric Development in Palestine." Wishart (1990) notes 
that this was an elaboration of earlier proposals calling for diversion 
of the Jordan River to irrigate the Mediterranean coast and the 
Negev. Part of this early plan included the diversion of the Yarmuk 
River, shared by Syria and Jordan with Israel (then a minor down- 
stream riparian; see Figure 2), to Lake Kinneret, which could then 
serve as a natural reservoir for both Israel and Jordan. At the same 
time there were discussions about building a canal between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan Valley and using the natural drop 
in elevation to generate hydroelectric power. 
The first formal plan for water management from Jordan 
during this period was the MacDonald Report in 1951 (Wishart, 
1990). The MacDonald Report outlined the conflicts between 
Jordan and Israel, particularly with regard to inter-basin transfers of 
water, and proposed that all developed water remain in the Jordan 
Valley. The proposal also included the Hays component of diverting 
the Yarmuk into Lake Kinneret. Shortly thereafter, concerned over 
sharing a reservoir with Israel, Jordan and Syria proposed a high dam 
on the Yarmuk River that would provide water storage and hydro- 
electric capacity. 
In late 195 3, the U. S. took a more active role in water planning 
in the region, and President Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston as 
a special ambassador to negotiate a water agreement among the 
riparian states. A secondary issue that was linked to the water 
negotiations was permanent settlement of 800,000 Palestinian refu- 
gees. With the exception of water diversions by Israel from the 
Jordan River to the coast, the Johnston Plan was similar to the above 
plans and contained three major planning components: storage, 
distribution, and allocation. Water storage included components 
from both earlier proposals for diverting Yarmuk River water and 
consisted of the construction of two primary facilities, a dam near 
Maqarin with a capacity of 300 Mcm for irrigation and power 
generation, and storage of Yarmuk River flood flows in Lake 
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TABLE 9. ALLOCATIONS OF THF, JORDAN RIVF,R UNDER UHF, 
JOHNSTON PLAN (AND COtJVffR-PROPOSAHS BY 
TIM ARAt3,S AND ISRAF,I,IS) 
ohnston Arab Tech. Cotton 
1953 1954 1954 
N. B.: water volume measured in million cubic metres. 
area measured in thousands of dunams. 
Source: Issac and Hosh, 1992. 
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Kinneret (also approximately 300 Mcm per year). The distribution 
system focused primarily on providing water to Jordan's East Ghor 
Canal, which supplies most of the surface water to the country. 
Water allocations were based on the principle that Arab states 
receive enough water to meet their irrigation needs with the remain- 
ing water divided between Jordan (the Yarmuk) and Israel (the 
Jordan). 
Agreement based on the Johnston Plan was reached for 
apportionment of Jordan River water (see Table 9), at least by the 
technical advisors. Discussions on the Johnston Plan concluded in 
1955, after political bickering effectively derailed all negotiations. 
Wishart (1990) presents a detailed explanation of the negotiations 
and the eventual breakdown, and concludes that the Arab states had 
little to lose by not entering into the agreement; indeed many of the 
projects outlined in the Johnston Plan were subsequently undertaken 
unilaterally by the riparian states. As well, formal acceptance of the 
plan by all the riparians would have amounted to implicit recognition 
ofthe sovereignty of Israel, something the Arab states were unwilling 
to grant at the time. Nevertheless, all of the riparians unofficially 
accepted the Johnston Plan, with the exception of Syria, which did 
not reject it, but simply failed to accept it (Sabbagh, 1992). It is also 
worth noting that there was no explicit allocation in the Johnston Plan 
for the Palestinians; their water was included in the Jordanian share. 
It is doubtful whether either Israel or Syria would now accept the 
Johnston Plan, since both have installed and operate their own water 
infrastructure which gives them more than their share alloted to them 
by Johnston. 
Since 1955, there has been little discussion over shared water 
agreements. Countries in the region have continued to develop their 
water resources, commonly at the expense of other countries. In 
addition, groundwater, which was not covered in the Johnston 
negotiations, has now become an important issue, particularly for 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Subsequent to 
dissolution of the Johnston Plan, Israel constructed the National 
Water Carrier, and Jordan further developed the East Ghor Canal off 
the Yarmuk River for imgation. Plans for a major multi-purpose 
(irrigation, drinking water, hydropower) dam on the Yarmuk River 
were revived by Jordan and Syria in the early 1970s Israel's 
territorial gains from the 1967 War had provided it with a stronger 
riparian position on the Yarmuk, and, because impoundment of 
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Yarmuk flows would affect downstream availability of water, Israel 
now had to be consulted and agree to the proposal. Before agreement 
between Israel and Jordan could be reached, problems arose between 
Syria and Jordan, with the result in 1980 that the Magarin Dam 
project was postponed (Taubenblatt, 1988). 
More recently, Zarour and Isaac (1992) have proposed a 
"pragmatic, applicable and dispassionate formula" for allocation of 
water rights. Beginning from the principles of limited territorial 
sovereignty in water use, and of the drainage basin, including both 
surface and underground water, as the relevant unit of analysis 
(based on the Helsinki rules of 1966 and 1987), they develop an 
equation that grants rights on the basis of equal weighting of 
contributions to supply and the sum of human withdrawals and 
natural losses. In a different approach to setting allocations by 
formula, Moore (1992) offers four possible definitions of equity, all 
acceptable under the Helsinki rules: existing water utilization, 
recharge area, natural flow, and population. He then suggests that 
the "optimal allocation regime" (elsewhere termed the "least worst 
regime") can be determined mathematically by minimizing the 
summation of the `error distances' from a notional line connecting 
points of 100 percent allocation to Palestinians and 100 percent 
allocation to Israelis. 
Though intriguing, such formulae seem too rigid to satisfy the 
many concerns other than geography and economic power (some 
might say "greed"). Perhaps an attempt should be made to apply the 
different formulae on paper to a number of situations and consider 
whether the derived results are likely to be acceptable to the relevant 
parties. However, the range of approaches suggested does show that 
the definition ofequity is anything but obvious, and that there do exist 
methods that would provide negotiators with at least indicative 
regimes for sharing available water. 
Although these past efforts at reaching basin-wide agreements 
on the water issue illustrate the inherent difficulties in such an 
approach, it is also apparent that there is an immediate need for a 
cooperative mechanism to be established to work towards a shared 
agreement. The emphasis should be on bilateral and multilateral 
approaches that are addressed at the same time as the political 
conflicts are being discussed. The political conflict will not be 
resolved in the absence of an agreement on the water issue, and it is 
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unlikely that the international water issues can be solved without 
some political agreement. 
Commercial Transactions for Sale of Water 
A number of authors have suggested that the evident surplus 
of water on the West Bank could, after independence is achieved, 
become not only a resource for internal development but also one that 
could be sold for hard currency. Heller and Nusseibah recognize this 
potential but are cautious in their suggestions: 
It is conceivable that the primary benefits 
that [the new Palestinian] state will derive from the 
river waters will be indirect, for example, through 
an agreement with Israel to make use of its National 
Water Carrier or to purchase at reduced rates 
certain water-intensive agricultural produce from 
Israel. (Heller and Nusseibah, 1991, p. 112) 
Somewhat in contrast, Zarour and Isaac suggest full acceptance 
ofwater as a market commodity, with potentially significant benefits 
for a future Palestine: 
An international open water market in the 
Middle East would be a good promoter of interna- 
tional cooperation in the area. Countries with water 
surpluses would be willing to trade water with short 
fall countries, in an arrangement fairly valuing 
water like any other commodity.... One potential 
application of this would be that the anticipated 
Palestinian entity could trade water rights with 
rights to access and use Israeli costs. (Zarour and 
Isaac, 1992, p. 23) 
Canadians may have some qualms about the final sentence, 
given the way some sectors in the United States have cast longing 
glances at water to the north, but the same perspective should give 
them grounds for recognizing why Palestinians at all levels feel that 
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water is such a critical resource for their future. Just as with 
Canadians, the issue for Palestinians is less whether there will be 
enough water for drinking and sanitation than whether water will be 
available in large enough quantities and low enough costs at appro- 
priate locations for sustainable economic development. 
In an earlier article, Zarour and Isaac (1991) had suggested a 
variation on the proposal for an open market in water. They propose 
using the water surplus they find in the West Bank to supply the Gaza 
Strip, which has a water deficit. No mention is made of an financial 
aspects, but, however one does the sums, it would surely be cheaper 
and technically more efficient to work out a trade, under which the 
West Bank would supply Israel and Israel in turn would supply Gaza. 
In summary, it seems that some form of controlled rather than 
fully open market for water could play a role both in balancing water 
supply and demand across borders and in supporting the economy of 
an underdeveloped Palestinian entity. Whether such a market could 
serve as a model for other states in the region or other areas of the 
world is too difficult to say at this time. 
Importation of Water by Sea 
Importation of water is under active consideration in the 
Middle East. Apart from short-term and small-scale deliveries by 
tanker trucks, the two options most relevant to Israel involve 
transportation by pipeline from Turkey or Egypt, and by ship or 
barge from one ofa number ofcountries but most likely Turkey. This 
section will include a review of the prospects for importing water by 
sea as a long-term option. The next section will review the prospects 
for international pipelines. 
Had the long drought continued into 1992, Israel would likely 
have imported water from Turkey using converted oil tankers to meet 
its short-term needs for domestic and municipal water. Turkey is the 
one country in the region with an unqualified surplus of fresh water, 
and rivers such as the Manavgat (which flows at an average rate of 
140 cubic metres per second6) appear to be large enough to supply, 
and deep enough offshore to provide anchorage for, ocean-going 
Tor purposes of conversion, 3.2 cubic metres per second is equivalent to just 
under 100 million cubic metres per year. 
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vessels. (Some analysts also suggest Lebanon as a source of water 
for export, but any surplus there will soon be absorbed by a growing 
population and economic development (Kubursi and Amery,1992).) 
Loading facilities are not negligible in either scale or cost, but neither 
is there anything unique about the design -- mainly tunnels and piping 
that, assuming a Manavgat source, would link a dam 12 kilometres 
upstream on the river to an off-shore loading terminal. 
Two main options have been considered: (1) converting oil 
tankers, perhaps supertankers, to carry water; and (2) loading the 
water into large bags that will be towed by tugs. The latter go by the 
name of "medusa bags" (not by reference to the character of Greek 
mythology but because they float easily as do the jellyfish of that 
name, allowing waves to pass through them). 
There have been a number of estimates of the costs of 
operating a tanker delivery system, and the estimates range by a 
factor of about three: from $0.35 to $1.10 per cubic metre. Per cubic 
metre ofwater delivered, supertankers can operate for much less than 
can smaller tankers, but conversion costs and loading facilities 
(mainly because of their deep draft) are much higher. At the lowest 
end of the cost estimates, which most analysts question, the tanker 
option would be marginally of interest. 
Potentially more important are medusa bags, which happen to 
be a Canadian technology (Cran, 1992). The bags, each of which 
carries about 1.5 Mcm, are made ofthick nylon coated with vinyl and 
reinforced with nylon straps. According to a study by Tahal (1989), 
costs for a complete system (bags, tugs, loading and unloading 
facilities, and even a 5 percent royalty) with a capacity of 250 Mcm 
per year would be $0.17 to $0.23 per cubic metre, depending mainly 
upon interest rates and the capacity factor (ie, the proportion of time 
each bag is carrying water as opposed to waiting at the terminal or 
in maintenance). Initial capital was estimated at about $280 million 
for a six-bag/six-tug system. While some technical uncertainties 
remain -- uncertainties that, Tahal warns, could increase costs 
considerably -- its initial estimates of costs make medusa bags 
competitive with some conventional sources of supply and very 
much so with most alternative sources. Environmental impacts are 
not mentioned by Tahal but, apart from construction, should be 
small. Of all the alternatives, the medusa bags seem to be most 
deserving of funding for prototype design and construction. 
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Even assuming that importation of water in medusa bags is 
economically attractive for Israel or other coastal nations in the 
region, transportation of water by sea, regardless of the means of 
conveyance, faces serious political barriers. Turkey was apparently 
so embarrassed by a 1990 article in the Wall Street Journal discuss- 
ing possible water sales to Israel that it broke off negotiations. 
Adverse Arab reactions could be reduced ifthe imports to Israel were 
balanced with a release by Israel of equal volumes of, for example, 
Jordan River water for use in the Occupied Palestinian Territories or 
in Jordan. In this way, the imports would become part of a regional 
solution. 
Water tankers or barges are, of course, extremely vulnerable 
from a military point ofview (as would be transportation by pipeline, 
as discussed below). Two options have been suggested to reduce the 
risks ofhostile action. First, ifthe imports are explicitly coupled with 
releases of water to Arab states, as suggested just above, an 
agreement could be signed such that any shortfalls resulting from 
hostile action would be shared among all the parties. Second, instead 
of using the water to feed directly into distribution systems, it could 
be used to recharge the Coastal Aquifer. In effect, the imported water 
would be treated as "capital" for future consumption rather than as 
"income" for immediate consumption. To this extent, it would mimic 
the Gur pipeline proposal and also eliminate the fear that any city 
would go thirsty because a ship had been lost. Indeed, use of 
imported water for recharge should reduce costs because it would 
eliminate the need for storage facilities to allow for delayed deliveries 
because of bad weather and to accommodate seasonal differences in 
water demand. 
Importation of Water by Pipeline 
Importation of water by pipeline as a long-term solution to 
Israel's water problems is also under consideration. Egypt and 
Turkey have both been mentioned as possible input sources for the 
pipeline. Despite some initial enthusiasm in Israel and Egypt for a 
pipeline to transfer Nile River water to Israel, Gaza and the West 
Bank (Kally, 1989), interest has cooled considerably. For one thing, 
Egypt sees less and less of a surplus in the Nile, and, for another, 
diversions of this scale would require agreement among all nine ofthe 
nations that lay claim to some portion of the Nile River. 
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Active interest in pipelines more recently has come from 
Turkev, which would like to play a major role in the future as water 
broker for the region. Perhaps 98 percent of the Euphrates River has 
its source in Turkey (Kolars, 1990). The river flows from central 
Turkey through Syria and then Iraq before emptying into the Persian 
Gulf, and it probably holds the greatest potential for supplying water 
to those parts of the region suffering from a water deficit. However, 
all depends upon Turkey's ` Nvater plan," which is based on its 
Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), including a number of major 
dams, some already built and some under construction or still in the 
planning stage. 
So far as Israel is concerned, the relevant part of the plan is a 
Turkish proposal to build two pipelines (generally referred to in the 
singular as the "Peace Pipeline") to take water from two rivers, the 
Seyhan and the Ceyhan that empty into the Mediterranean Sea, 
southward to the Arab states and maybe Israel (Figure 6). (Kolars 
(1990) indicates that these tNvo rivers do not have enough water but 
that the Goksu River does and only requires that the pipeline be 80 
kilometres longer.) The western line would extend 2800 kilometres 
and pump 3.5 Mcm of water per day (1300 Mcm per year) to Syria, 
Jordan, and western Saudi Arabia; this line could include an exten- 
sion into Israel. The eastern line would cover 4000 kilometres en 
route to the Persian Gulf through Kuwait, eastern Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The two 
pipelines together would cost $21 billion. A more modest "mini- 
pipeline" has also been proposed (though not by Turkish officials) to 
supply water to Syria, Jordan and the West Bank. It would have a 
capacity of about 2 Mcm per day (730 Mcm per year) and cost 
perhaps $5 billion. 
The success of any of these projects is dependent first on 
resolution of the present dispute over Turkey's control of the 
Euphrates River, which has often had negative impacts downstream 
(Kolars, 1990). For example, during the filling of the reservoir 
behind the Ataturk Dam in 1990, Turkey cut off the Euphrates River 
for 30 days, which forced Syria and Iraq to ration water and limit 
electricity use. The pipeline projects are also dependent on strong 
political support within Turkey. The new Prime Minister is less 
interested than his predecessor in promoting Turkey as a water 
broker to the region. Finally, even if political problems could be 
resolved, the projects would still require financing. In any of its 
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versions, the Peace Pipeline would be a megaproject, and no country 
or international bank has indicated much interest in putting up the 
funds. Therefore, plans for the Peace Pipeline are currently on hold. 
Despite current lack of interest, pipeline proposals continue to 
surface (Gruen, 1992). While costs are high, they may nevertheless 
be acceptable in comparison with other alternative sources, par- 
ticularly for land-locked countries. Cost figures generally range 
upwards from about $0.40 per cubic metre, not much above present 
costs. The problem is that pipelines have significant economies of 
scale, and the lower cost estimates all depend upon large volumes. 
The only end-use that could absorb such large volumes is irrigation, 
but few irrigated crops anywhere in the region have a marginal value 
that makes it worth paying the costs of conventional sources, much 












Figure 6. Turkey's proposed Peace Pipeline 
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Security of supply is an important issue among countries that 
have seldom known peace. The possibility that Israel, or any 
country, would relinquish part of its sovereignty to Turkey, which 
would control the flow ofwater in the pipeline (as would, to a reduced 
extent, every nation higher on the pipeline) is remote, at least without 
the establishment ofan international authority to operate and monitor 
the pipeline. The options to reduce vulnerability of importing water 
by pipeline are similar to those of importing by sea. 
Finally, the environmental impacts of inter-basin water trans- 
fers in the Middle East remain to be determined. Perhaps small in the 
case of tankers or medusa bags, they could be sizable at both ends of 
a pipeline. Little or none of the considerable discussion of the 
potential for pipeline projects has anything to say about environmen- 
tal effects. 
Militarization and Annexation 
In the absence of any concerted effort and action on one or 
more of the above alternatives, there remains the possibility that 
Israel would use military force to supplement its existing water 
supplies. As discussed previously, the water issue has been milita- 
rized in the past, and it can readily be argued that this may also be the 
case in the future. Thus, King Hussein of Jordan has been quoted as 
saying that he could conceive of few reasons to go to war with Israel, 
but water is one of them (Naff, 1990). 
Not everyone agrees that war is inevitable in the absence of 
international agreement. Salih and All (1992, p. 46) admit that water 
scarcity is a constraint on development, but argue "that this hardly 
justifies sounding the danger bells of the possibility of regional wars 
over water." In their view, those who anticipate a war neglect the 
wide range of options ordinary people have devised to overcome or 
get around water scarcity. Homer-Dixon and others involved in a 
study ofenvironmental change and acute conflict (1993, p.45) follow 
a similar approach in arguing that "water shortages will aggravate 
tensions and unrest within societies in the Jordan River basin," but 
that warfare among riparians is unlikely. They go on to quote 
Thomas Naff in suggesting that "internal civil disorder, changes in 
regimes, political radicalization and instability" are the more likely 
consequences of water shortages in the region. 
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There is some support for the theory that water had a key role 
in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel. Israel actually gains 
relatively little in terms of its entire water budget from the area it 
occupies in southern Lebanon, but it does give the state control of all 
sources ofthe upper Jordan and may allow the Israelis to divert water 
from the Litani through the use of a tunnel system which could 
increase Israeli supplies by as much as 500 Mcm annually (Anderson, 
1988). This figure, however, is highly contentious, and others have 
argued the total gain from Israel diverting the river would be on the 
order of 100 Mcm annually. The official Israeli intention to occupy 
a security zone in southern Lebanon has been interpreted throughout 
the Arab region as a scheme to divert the Litani, and this strengthened 
Arab convictions that capturing and retaining control of the river is 
the long-term Israeli goal (International Commission, 1983, p. 12; 
Cooley, 1984; see Chapter VI, section E. for a more detailed 
discussion of the Litani River). Claims that Israel is attempting to 
divert Litani River water for use within Israel, however, are unsub- 
stantiated, as noted above. These claims have also been strongly 
denied by the Israeli government, though the subject has obviously 
been under discussion at the highest levels. Thus, Cabinet Minister 
Ne'eman advocated remaining in southern Lebanon and controlling 
the country up to north of the Litam, and other Israeli officials have 
suggested aiding in the installation of a Christian regime in Lebanon 
allied with Israel so that the territory from the Litani southward can 
be annexed to Israel. Naff and Matson (1984) also point out that 
some people in Israel have argued that Litam water is the only source 
which will allow Israel to maintain present consumption rates and 
allow the government to avoid the difficult choices accompanying 
conservation measures. 
The invasion of southern Lebanon could be similar to the 
acquisition of territory in the 1967 War; Israel may have gained 
territory for political purposes, but found that exploiting the newly 
available resources led to a dependence which made withdrawal 
extremely difficult (Calleigh, 1983). Despite the questionable 
validity of the claims of Israeli activity with respect to Litam waters, 
it is clear that Israel's invasion of Lebanon has strengthened suspi- 
cion among its Arab neighbours regarding its need for increased 
water resources. 
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PLANNING FOR A DIFFERENT FUTURE 
There are many analogies between the post-1973 experience 
with energy and what is now occurring with water. Both water and 
energy have been priced below true costs; in both cases, environ- 
mental damages occur at the production and end-use stages; both are 
governed by institutions geared to augment supply rather than to 
manage demand; and both are so widely used that many people doubt 
that conservation can be an effective force. 
The conventional approach to supply-demand problems with 
either energy or water focuses on ensuring that adequate supplies 
exist to meet present and future energy (water) "requirements," 
typically expressed graphically as curves of consumption that rise 
with time. This perspective (with its roots in the old dogma of the 
insatiability of human wants -- now questioned by both ecologists 
and economists) leads to a supply orientation in which demand is 
treated as virtually exogenous to policy, a "given" which must be 
satisfied by ever-greater development of new sources of supply. 
Conservation may be considered, but generally as a way to buy the 
time necessary to bring new supplies on line. 
The alternative approach to analysis of energy -- dubbed the 
"soft energy path" -- challenges conventional wisdom at each ofthese 
points (Lovins, 1977). Space does not permit even a cursory review 
of soft energy analysis, but at its core are three principles: (1) focus 
on the services provided by energy, not on the commodity itself; (2) 
emphasis on the quality of energy as well as on quantity; and (3) 
attention to the future rather than the present. Each has its analogy 
with water. Quality considerations are more obvious with water than 
with energy, but the points about services and the future deserve 
further explanation. 
Demand First 
The most distinctive policy implication of soft path analysis 
is its emphasis on correcting apparent supply-demand imbalances 
from the demand side, quite the opposite of traditional energy or 
water policy. This approach is based on recognition that energy 
(water) use is only a means to an end, not the end in itself, and that 
the purpose of energy (water) consumption is to satisfy particular 
end-uses or services, such as growing a certain amount of protein or 
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cooling a certain amount of material. The question then becomes 
how each end-use or service can be most efficiently satisfied. 
The soft path stands the conventional approach on its head. 
Analysis always starts with end-uses, not sources of supply, and this 
reversal forces a bottom-up rather than top-down view. From this 
perspective, conservation and efficiency are not merely interim 
necessities, but the primary component of rational resource plan- 
ning, the first place on which to focus attention. Each end-use is 
broken down (in as much detail as data permit) so that more and more 
efficient approaches to satisfying the service can be identified. As 
Lovins remarks, "in the soft path how much energy we use to 
accomplish our social goals is considered a measure not of our 
success but of our failure." Once beyond the 100 or so litres of water 
per person-day needed for drinking, cooking and sanitation, exactly 
the same is, or should be, true of water. 
However, the analogy between energy and water is not 
perfect. Among other things: water lacks the direct linkage to 
thermodynamics that permits energy efficiency to be defined pre- 
cisely; except for hydropower, energy supply does not vary from year 
to year; direct use of water is more important than indirect (unless 
irrigation water is ascribed to food); and water use is more highly 
concentrated by sector than is energy. Nevertheless, the analyses 
already done and referred to in Section IV.C suggest enormous 
opportunities to maintain standards of living, and very possibly raise 
quality of life, with lower consumption of water. For both water and 
energy, the amounts actually needed to support life, indeed to support 
a high quality of life, represent but a small fraction oftotal consump- 
tion. The lesson for both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories is that the largest, safest and cheapest "source of supply" 
for water is likely to be found through conservation in and realloca- 
tion of existing uses. 
Backcasting 
Water is so closely connected with life itself, and with our 
common history in agriculture, that we tend to forget that it also has 
economic and ecological dimensions. Thus, we should be suspicious 
of projections that show increasing deficits between water use and 
water flows, deficits that cannot possibly be sustained. It would be 
more useful to recast the analysis in terms of scenarios and experi- 
ment with "backcasting" so as to determine where the system can 
107 
Economic, F_cological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Water In Israel 
give and the feasibility and impacts of alternative policies and 
reactions (Robinson, 1988 and 1990). This too is part of the 
experience from soft energy analysis, and a part whose virtues have 
been demonstrated. Traditional forecasting always showed the need 
for greater supplies whereas backcasting indicated the option to 
maintain or cut consumption. Actual energy use patterns have turned 
out to be much closer to those suggested by the soft path than by 
traditional analysis. 
There are at least three other ways in which backcasting of soft 
water paths could work to reduce conflicts in the Middle East. First, 
because it is concerned not with what futures are likely to happen but 
with how desirable futures can be obtained, backcasting is an 
explicitly normative exercise. It has none of the pretensions to 
objectivity sometimes alleged by forecasting. This makes it an ideal 
partner for political science in a search for regional cooperation and 
accommodation. All sides see close linkages between water avail- 
ability and national political and economic security. It is therefore 
only through the exploration of alternative futures, not simply a 
projection of the present into the future, that we will find ways to 
minimize the potential for continuing conflict. 
Second, apparent conflicts between economics and environ- 
ment that arise so commonly when viewed from the supply side are 
typically attenuated if they do not totally disappear when viewed 
from the demand side. With only scattered exceptions, the same 
policies that promote more efficient use and greater conservation 
also support environmental protection. For example, efficient 
irrigation systems reduce the risk of soil salinization, and low-flow 
household appliances cut wastewater flows into sewers. As environ- 
mental values become more and more important, along with concerns 
about the quality of water, backcasts will show degrees of flexibility 
in policy that are typically obscured by forecasts. 
Finally, backcasting can test the resiliency of alternative 
scenarios to the extreme weather patterns that are typical of climate 
patterns in the Middle East. The impacts of weather patterns on 
water supply are much greater than on energy supply (where they 
affect mainly the volume of hydroelectricity that can be generated.) 
Backcasting water end-use scenarios can with relative ease incorpo- 
rate loops to show the impacts of sharply different availability of 
water on the economy. 
108 
Economic, Ecological and Geopolitical Dimensions of Water In Israel 
VIII. GETTING STARTED: 
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conflict between the Palestinian people and 
the State of Israel, and to a lesser degree the conflict 
between Israel and the Arab countries has centered 
around the issue of land and water. . . . The 
academic and scientific community has a primary 
obligation in this regard since the alternative leaves 
the situation in the hands of others who are guided 
either by logic of power or the passions of political 
partisanship. 
(Kuttub, 1992) 
The following recommendations are intended as initial steps 
toward reducing or alleviating the water crisis in Israel, and by so 
doing, reducing or alleviating both water problems and political 
problems vis-a-vis the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It must be 
emphasized from the outset that in no way do we deny the need for 
Israel to be secure in its water supply. Rather, we wish to emphasize 
the inefficiencies -- economic, political and institutional -- that play 
such an important role in Israel's water crisis, and that, if corrected, 
could go far toward relieving the crisis. As Lowi (1991) insists, the 
concept of "security" must be defined in senses broader than direct 
control over sources. 
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ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES 
This section will identify some domestic and regional recom- 
mendations by which Israel might begin to deal with the quantity, 
quality and geopolitical dimensions of its water crisis. Placing 
domestic options before regional ones is not accidental. We believe 
that Israel -- along with each of the other states in the region -- can 
and should take the initial steps toward mitigating the water crisis in 
areas clearly within their own jurisdiction. Regional agreements for 
sharing water are probably the best solution, but they are less likely 
to come, about and even less likely to be stable, if the participating 
nations do not have their own water-resource-and-use house in order. 
More generally, we believe that it is appropriate to set out an 
ordering of priorities for resolution of water issues in Israel. We 
advance them with considerable confidence that they apply to other 
countries in the immediate region, and we suspect that they can be 
applied generally throughout Middle East. 
The first priority must be accorded to internal 
measures for attaining greater efficiency in the use 
of water, including both micro options aimed at the 
point of use and macro options in selecting among 
uses to be served with water. 
Second priority is also internal but focuses on 
developing alternative sources of supply, and par- 
ticularly sources that can deliver water of lower 
levels of quality than are needed for drinking, 
cooking and washing. 
Third priority should go to intra-regional agree- 
ments and institutions for managing water, for 
sharing supplies, and for avoiding or mitigating 
quality problems. 
Only then, fourth, should consideration be given to 
inter-basin transfers of water and to megaprojects 
such as large-scale desalination. 
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We do not maintain that this order of priorities must be 
followed in every case or every locale. The Gaza Strip, for example, 
may already be experiencing such heavy demands on its water that 
only the third and fourth options have any significant potential. 
Many analysts would accept the ordering but argue that we should 
move sooner rather than later toward options in the third and fourth 
priority categories (for example, Shuval, 1992). Nevertheless, we 
believe that this ordering represents a good starting point from which 
each nation, and indeed each village, neighbourhood and sector, can 
begin gaining control of its water resource situation. We also suggest 
that the proposed ordering is generally consistent with two princi- 
ples: (1) to focus first on options that are small in scale and locale- 
specific (Falkenmark et al, 1989); and (2) to start with options that 
are less capital intensive and only later move toward those that are 
more so. None of the needed steps is easy or cheap, but some are 
easier and cheaper than others. 
One final point: Each priority level above and each recom- 
mendation below contains both technical and institutional dimen- 
sions. Emphasis here is placed on the latter. In part this emphasis 
is intended to offset the tendency that cuts across all literature on 
water to focus on technical solutions. However, in larger part it is 
intended to emphasize that attention to institutional issues cannot be 
left to the future, after a peace settlement. Any approach toward 
sustainable and equitable management of water will require imagi- 
nation and innovation, on the one hand, together with experience and 
plain common sense, on the other, in institutional design and opera- 
tion. As noted by Homer-Dixon et al (1993, p. 45), "The role of 
social ingenuity as a precursor to technical ingenuity is often 
overlooked." 
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DOMESTIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following steps are, in our view, fundamental for Israel. 
They would in each case, and even more so if taken together, shift 
Israel onto a water strategy that would leave the nation economically 
stronger and politically more secure, while at the same time offering 
a path that is considerably less environmentally damaging than the 
path now being followed. 
A broad and enforceable strategy for water conser- 
vation must be the very first step toward reducing 
water scarcity. This strategy should, as appropri- 
ate for sector and end-use, include information 
programs, financial incentives, minimum efficiency 
standards, and regulation. 
Appropriate (marginal cost) pricing of water to 
encourage efficiency in allocation and use should be 
gradually introduced in all sectors, together with 
gradual reduction or elimination of subsidies to the 
agricultural sector. As well, low prices for initial 
quantities of fresh water to all households can be 
justified on grounds of equity. 
Remove the Water Commission from the authority 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, and give the com- 
mission the independence, status and structure to 
design and implement a more sectorally neutral 
water system. Responsibilities ofthe new commis- 
sion should include, inter alia, water planning, 
water pricing and water efficiency standards. 
Encourage a shift in agricultural production pat- 
terns to reduce emphasis on water-intensive crops 
and increase productivity of drought-resistant and 
salt-tolerant crops. Grants or loans ofvarious kinds 
can be provided to assist farmers in the transition. 
Encourage a shift to less water-intensive activities 
(eg, from agriculture to light industry). Again, 
incentives to promote a shift may be appropriate for 
an interim period. 
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Enact and enforce tough pollution control laws 
under the control of the Ministry of the Environ- 
ment, with particular attention to agricultural run- 
off and industrial wastewater. 
Continue the trend towards full use of recycled 
water for agriculture or for recharging aquifers, in 
parallel with: (1) investment in modern sewerage 
systems wherever they do not now exist (including 
systems for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip); (2) 
repair of those existing systems that appear to be 
leaking; and (3) establishment ofclear standards for 
treatment and use of recycled water. 
REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conflict management literature distinguishes four main 
causes of conflict: a conflict over data; a conflict over incompatible 
interests; a conflict generated by value differences (ie, incompatible 
religious or cultural values); and a conflict over relationships (where 
values may not be in conflict, but the relationships between individu- 
als, groups or nation-states may conflict). Only conflicts over data 
(for example, over "facts" of resource use or current resource 
availability) are clearly amenable to resolution by research. Con- 
flicts between stakeholders who believe their interests to be incom- 
patible may be mitigated by research that demonstrates the existence 
or viability of alternatives not previously taken into account. The 
other forms of conflict are less susceptible to reduction by the search 
for greater knowledge and depend rather on the search for acceptable 
political options. 
The conflicts over water in the Jordan River basin stem from 
the interaction of all of these causes, and only when institutions 
designed to eliminate these causes are put into place will reasonable 
solutions be achieved. As was noted above, the difficulties in the 
implementation of water resource management policies with respect 
to international river basins stem primarily from the political unwill- 
ingness of states to enter into formal cooperative arrangements. 
Present institutional means for resolving these disputes in the Jordan 
River basin over the long term are simply inadequate to meet the 
needs of reducing the water problems in this region. Given the 
complexity of water problems in this region, it is not surprising that 
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there has never been any official agreements on water between any 
Arab country -- or the Palestinians -- and the State of Israel (al- 
Khatib, 1992). 
As a way of restarting progress toward regional negotiation 
and cooperation, it is worth looking at a set of recommendations from 
the International Conference on Water and the Environment held in 
Dublin in 1992 related to transboundary basins. The three relevant 
recommended actions were: 
(1) That countries evaluate the experience gained 
with existing transboundary basin water authori- 
ties, committees and commissions; 
(2) That countries support the further develop- 
ment of ... institutional mechanisms for the co- 
ordination of water management within 
transboundary basins; and 
(3) That non-riparian nations promote and sup- 
port the co-operation of riparian countries within a 
transboundary basin in the establishment of appro- 
priate legal, institutional and operational mecha- 
nisms. 
The types of institutional mechanisms that could be proposed 
vary widely -- from institutes which promote data sharing and joint 
monitoring (the simplest to develop), to water policy development 
agencies, to river basin management committees (the most complex, 
particularly if they include provisions for joint action). 
In addition to the committees and institutions that have been 
established in various jurisdictions to address transboundary river 
basin issues, numerous management agreements have been signed to 
address specific aspects of river management. These agreements 
generally fall into one of two categories: those aimed at an equitable 
apportionment of water supplies (eg, the 1959 agreement between 
the then United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan, and the 
Indus Waters Treaty of 1960) and those which promote joint 
management or exploitation of a river basin (eg, the Columbia 
River Treaty of 1961 between the U.S. and Canada). 
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It is imperative that a regional water institution for the Jordan 
River basin be established that, at the very least, will act as an 
information clearing house and that could, eventually, evolve toward 
a river basin management authority. This would set the stage for a 
bilateral (or trilateral) agreement for sharing water resources, as was 
apparently included in the Camp David accords. It would also allow 
for the re-establishment of international negotiations for the overall 
design of a water system for the region, as with, for example, the 
Johnston Plan, and also permit the extension of such a design from 
surface to underground flows. 
A useful point of departure for such an agreement might be 
found through renewal of efforts to rebuild the dam on the Yarmuk 
that was destroyed by Israeli bombers in the 1967 War. Naff (1990) 
provides ample evidence ofthe potential benefits ofthe dam. Among 
other things, it could provide the basis for construction of the long- 
proposed West Ghor canal, which would be siphoned under the 
Jordan River and provide a more stable water regime to West Bank 
farmers and communities (Shuval, 1992). While he emphasizes the 
need for cooperation and at least some degree of trust among nations 
that are still in a state of war with one another, Naff also views the 
dam as "an extraordinary opportunity" in the pursuit of peace (p. 
165). 
If trust has reached a point where shared research can be 
considered, a joint regional research institute on water could be 
developed. There is a need for a regional institute that would 
emphasize alternatives to the use of fresh water in agriculture, as with 
study of the long-term implications of greater use of recycled water 
and brackish water. (There are many water issues that deserve study, 
but this is one that is particularly important to the region and to which 
the joint institute could make a unique international contribution.) If 
such an institute is considered, it would be essential that it incorpo- 
rate teams working from both technical and socio-economic perspec- 
tives. 
Finally, some forms of technical and financial assistance 
appear to be needed. Assistance should be provided to help Pales- 
tinianfarmers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, or in the future 
Palestine, to install and adopt improved irrigation practices that will 
ensure that more ofthe water applied reaches the plants. As well, an 
infrastructure investment program is needed to provide higher 
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quality potable water to residents of cities and towns, and, even more 
pressing, to carry off their wastewater. In most cases, new sewage 
systems will be needed, but in a few cases, repairs to existing leaky 
systems may be feasible. In either case, construction of sewers 
should be integrated with development of a wastewater recycling 
system that could supplement other sources of irrigation water for 
West Bank farmers. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TIN, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 
It seems inevitable that some change occur in the status of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. This is not the place to discuss the 
nature, size or political status of the entity that will emerge. How- 
ever, while that process is evolving, there are a number of things that 
Israel could do to alleviate conditions for Palestinians living in the 
Territories and, perhaps, improve the climate for negotiations be- 
tween Palestinians and Israelis. 
Perhaps most important, there should be an imme- 
diate allocation of more water to Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, partly as a gesture of good 
will and partly because it will force some coopera- 
tion between Israeli authorities and whatever Pales- 
tinian authority may emerge from the present peace 
negotiations. This water would be released for 
agricultural or other economic developments, not 
only for household and urban use. (As indicated 
above, the Israelis have generally made water avail- 
able as needed for the latter uses, but have not 
permitted the former to expand since 1967.) 
Israeli officials, notably in the Water Commission, 
should reduce the level of security attached to water 
data and make them more widely available. (Over 
the past year, steps have be taken to this effect.) To 
the extent possible, the data should be released in 
both processed and unprocessed form. In addition, 
ways should be found to ensure that water data are 
as available to Palestinians as to Israelis, something 
that is not currently the case. At the First Israel- 
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Palestinian International Academic Conference on 
Water in Zurich in late 1992, the Truman Research 
Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
pledged to ensure that data sharing became a real- 
ity. That pledge should be acted upon, with, as 
appropriate, the assistance of other nations and 
international agencies. 
Occupation authorities should explicitly recognize 
a joint concern for water use between the two 
peoples, and they should accept some degree of joint 
planning and management of shared water resources. 
Implicitly, of course, this would amount to a state- 
ment of Israeli dependency on water originating in 
the final Palestinian entity, but this is a matter of 
fact and would merely establish a basis from which 
discussions about sharing, likely with some form of 
compensation, could begin. 
Once that joint concern and a strong role for Pales- 
tinian participation are accepted, a number of ac- 
tions are indicated, among them: 
- Improvement of the quality of water in the 
Lower Jordan (below Lake Kinneret) which 
Palestinian farmers currently find too saline for 
most crops. 
- Planning and construction of water and sew- 
age systems throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza, with most if not all the sewage reclaimed 
for use within the Territories. (Such a general 
position should not preclude exchanges of ei- 
ther water or reclaimed sewage when that is 
more efficient than totally independent sys- 
tems.) 
Given recognition of Palestinian responsibility to 
manage water, Israel should indicate that those 
aquifers on the West Bank that both rise on the West 
Bank and flow eastward rather than westward or 
northward will henceforth be managed by and for 
the Palestinian community. 
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Israel should reduce if not cease pumping from 
wells to the west of the Gaza Strip in order that flow 
rates in the aquifer supplying that area can increase. 
If nothing else, Israeli justification for pumping 
from these wells (at the up-flow end of the aquifer) 
is totally inconsistent with its justification for pump- 
ing from the Mountain Aquifer (at the down-flow 
end of the aquifer) (al-Khatib, 1992). 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The current Middle East peace process pro- 
vides Israel, for the first time in its history, with a 
real opportunity for the recognition of its entitle- 
ments to both existence and land by the Arabs. Of 
course, a by-product of this would be the acknowl- 
edgement by Israel's neighbours of its entitlement 
to a fair proportion of the area's waters. On equal 
footing, the peace process provides the Palestin- 
ians, too, with their first opportunity for national 
recognition by Israel. Among national rights, of 
course, are entitlements to natural resources such as 
water. The sticky point comes in deciding who is 
entitled to how much of the area's limited water 
resources. Obviously this question is not limited in 
scope to Israel and the anticipated Palestinian en- 
tity, but applies further to the other involved coun- 
tries in the area. 
(Zarour and Isaac, 1992, p. 3) 
This monograph has examined the economic, ecological, and 
political dimensions of Israel's water problem and developed a set of 
alternatives for resolving - or reducing the extent of - these problems. 
What is clear from the discussion of these issues is that the water 
"crisis" is actually a set of three problems; water quantity; water 
quality; and the geopolitics of water. What is also clear is that these 
problems are interrelated; possible solutions must address all three. 
To complicate matters even more, some of the least costly alterna- 
tives are also the least palatable; economic efficiency often conflicts 
with security objectives or with Zionist ideology and history. 
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In areas of water stress, which is clearly the case for the three 
main riparians of the Jordan River, only those approaches that treat 
quantity and quality issues together, and that avoid economics- 
ecology conflicts can be taken seriously. This requires coordinated 
management, and especially demand management. Even if the 
countries of the region are relatively careful in their use of water by 
international standards, they are far short ofeither the technical or the 
economic potential to greatly enhance water supply. And, given 
expected levels of population and aspirations for economic develop- 
ment, they have no alternative but to exploit the potential for demand 
management fully. In short, conservation and efficiency in the 
delivery and use of water are likely to be the most important "sources 
of supply" in the Middle East. They are also likely to be the cheapest 
and the least environmentally damaging sources. 
Some people view today's water problems in Israel, indeed 
throughout the Jordan Valley, as reaching crisis proportions; others 
argue that those problems are merely the latest version of a chronic 
situation. Depending upon the particular aspect ofthe problem under 
question, either approach can be justified. However, it is clear that 
Israel has a crisis in water management. That crisis has both internal 
and external dimensions. It can be resolved only by putting its own 
water management house in order and by accepting means for 
equitable sharing of water resources with Palestinians and Jordam- 
ans. 
Finally, one cannot ignore that the politics of water in the 
region are being played out in a very international context. With only 
a few exceptions, every nation in the Middle East depends on water 
supplies in which at least one other nation -- and commonly an 
upstream nation on a river or an up-flow nation on an aquifer -- has 
a significant interest. This explains in part why some nations which 
are usually antagonistic to Israel are rather more moderate in the case 
of water. Whatever Syria, for example, may claim about limiting 
Israeli rights to Jordan River water could, later, be applied by Turkey 
to limit Syria's rights to Euphrates River water. 
In our view, the quotation from Zarour and Isaac that is cited 
at the head of this final chapter is the best single statement of which 
we are aware of the importance of water for both Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, and for both the present time and 
the future. We share their perspective, and we share the statement's 
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implicit optimism. Around the world, water use is growing faster 
than population. That future is simply not available to most people 
in the Middle East, and most certainly not to those who share the 
Jordan River basin. In terms of the peace process, therefore, water 
resources must be both means and ends. 
- end - 
WATER IS FAR FROM A SIMPLE COMMOmTY; 
WATER'S A SOCIOLOGICAL, ODDITY. 
WATER'S A PASTURE. FOR SCIENCE, TO FORAGE. IN; 
WATER'S A MARK OF OUR DUBIOUS ORIGIN. 
WATER'S A I.INK wrM A DISTANT FUTURITY; 
WATER'S A SYMBOL, OF RITUAL, PURITY. 
WATER IS POLITICS, WATER'S RELIGION; 
WATER IS JUST ABOUT ANYONE'S PIGEON. 
WATER IS FRIGHTENING, WATER'S ENDFARING; 
WATER IS MORE, THAN MERE ENGINEERING, 
WATER IS TRAGICAL., WATER IS COMICAL;, 
WATER IS FAR FROM THE, PURE, ECONOMICAL 
SO STUDIES OF WATER, THOUGH FREE FROM ARIDITY; 
ARE APT TO PRODUCE A GOOD DFAI, OF TIJRBIDITy. 
(KENNETH Bou.WNG, 1964) 
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APPENDIX 
(Adapted from: Shuval, 1992). 
CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, 
FEARS AND CONCERNS 
Shuval (1992) details some of the claims and counterclaims as 
well as the real and perceived fears and concerns of the two sides of 
the dispute over the Mountain Aquifer. 
PALF,STINIAN CLAIMS AND CONCERNS 
1.The Palestinians claim that the flow of the Mountain Aquifer 
-- which is fed by rainfall over the West Bank, and 90% of which is 
currently extracted from deep wells mainly within Israel -- should be 
allocated for their use, and that Israel's much criticized, long term 
over-pumping of the aquifer is a serious threat to the Palestinians' 
future essential water reserves. 
2.The Palestinians are concerned that Israel, because of in- 
creased demands for development from the mass immigration of 
Jews from Russia and other countries, will extract more water from 
the Mountain Aquifer, depriving the Palestinians of an equitable 
share. Some Arab leaders have requested that authorities in these 
countries stop the emigration of Jews to Israel. 
3.The Palestinians claim that the Israel Civil Administration has 
effectively frozen Palestinian utilization of water sources in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, allocating insufficient amounts for 
urban and industrial use and practically no water for increased 
agricultural development or to meet the needs of a growing popula- 
tion. They claim that during the period of occupation, Israeli 
authorities have developed new water supplies in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and have allocated significant amounts of 
water for agricultural and urban use for new Jewish settlement in the 
areas. The Palestinians claim that this violates the Geneva Conven- 
tion and that Israel misuses its authority as the "belligerent occu- 
pier." Particularly aggravating to Palestinian villagers is the 
perception of wasteful Israeli water use and landscape practices 
which often include the irrigation of lawns and the construction of 
swimming pools. 
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4.The Palestinians claim that the process of drilling new deep 
wells within the Occupied Palestinian Territories is depleting the 
aquifer, and traditional springs and shallow wells used for domestic 
and agricultural purposes in neighbouring Palestinian communities 
are drying out. They claim that Israel's pumping of groundwater 
near the Gaza Strip has caused the severe salination of the wells in 
Gaza. Even when the Israeli authorities supply water to the 
communities that lost their original wells or springs, the cost to the 
villagers is increased, which is viewed by Israelis as an appropriate 
method of controlling demand. 
5.The Palestinians claim that in all new water projects developed 
by Israel in the Territories and which serve Palestinian communities, 
key controlling elements such as regional reservoirs, valves and 
control points are located within Jewish settlements, which is viewed 
as a method of domination. 
6.The Palestinians fear that, even if a peace settlement is 
achieved, and an appropriate Palestinian entity established, the 
division of the very limited shared water resources will leave them 
with insufficient amounts of water to accomodate population growth 
and the resettlement of the Palestinian diaspora with the required 
urban, industrial and agricultural development. 
7.In the event of major regional projects to import water to the 
region, there is concern and fear that Israel will retain practical and 
political control over all water supplied to the Palestinians and 
Jordan. There is equal concern that other nations ofthe region, which 
may supply additional water or allow water pipelines to pass through 
their territory, will use the water supply lines for purposes ofpolitical 
control, as Turkey did in the case of the Iraqi oil pipelines during the 
Gulf War of 1990-91. 
8.In general, the Palestinians claim the priority rights to com- 
plete and total control of "Palestinian" water (the Mountain Aquifer) 
and suggest that complicated schemes to import water from other 
nations or to desalinate seawater be allocated to Israel which, in 
return, should forgo claims to the local, easily accessible, "Arab" 
water sources. 
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ISRAEL'S CI,AINIS AND CONCERNS 
I. Israel claims that it has legitimate historical riparian rights to 
the Mountain Aquifer, based on the principle of prior use. Major 
portions of this aquifer flow naturally into its territory and have been 
developed at great expense and fully utilized over the past 60 years. 
2.lsrael is concerned that ifthe Palestinians achieve autonomy or 
independence, they will gain physical control of the Territory, and 
carry out their claim that all of the water of the shared Yarkon- 
Tanninim Aquifer (Mountain Aquifer) that is derived from rainfall 
within the West Bank (estimated to be about 80 percent of the total 
flow of the aquifer) be allocated exclusively for their own use. This 
fear is compounded in Israel's eyes by Palestinian goals of returning 
the Palestinian diaspora to any independent entity which is estab- 
lished. 
Some Israelis claim that if there is a major increase in pumping 
from the aquifer, it would mean a drastic reduction of Israel's most 
important, high-quality, source of drinking water. It might mean a 
reduction of Israel's current utilization of that aquifer by some 300 
Mcm per year, cutting off of the drinking water supplies for some 3 
million people. Needless to say, this would be totally unacceptable 
to Israel. 
3. Even if an equitable agreement is achieved on the division of 
the waters of the Mountain Aquifer between Israel and any future 
Palestinian entity, there is serious concern about the possible degra- 
dation of the quality of the water of the shared Mountain Aquifer as 
a result of inadequate monitoring and control of urban pollution, 
wastewater and toxic agricultural and industrial wastes in the West 
Bank. This could cause serious pollution in the highly susceptible 
karstic limestone aquifer, making the water unfit for human con- 
sumption. 
In 1990, General (Reserves) Raphael Eitan, at that time the 
Minister ofAgriculture of Israel, published a full page ad in the Israel 
press (Jerusalem Post, August 10, 1990) expressing many of the 
above concerns, and declaring that because of the water issue alone, 
Israel can never give up the physical control of any of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories since they are absolutely essential for the 
preservation ofthe country's vital water resources. He cited both the 
threat ofthe diversion and/or overpumping of water vital to Israel and 
the danger of environmental pollution of the shared aquifer. 
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4.There is also concern that unregulated overpumping of the 
Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank could lead to a serious lowering 
of the water table with the resulting danger of the saltwater intrusion 
and irreversible damage to the shared aquifer which could be a real 
threat to both partners. 
5.Palestinian calls for the ending of immigration to Israel from 
Russia and other countries is seen as an unacceptable interference in 
Israel's internal affairs. Israel views unrestricted immigration of 
Jewish refugees as the foundation stone and raison d'etre of the 
country and any demand to restrict immigration is seen as unaccept- 
able. 
6.Israeli officials maintain that Palestinians have not been 
deprived ofthe use ofneeded water. They cite the construction ofnew 
water supply pipes, introduced by Israel since the end of Jordanian 
rule in 1967; the granting of permits to the Palestinians to drill some 
40 new deep wells; and the importation of water from the National 
Water Carrier to increase the water supplies to Palestinian cities and 
villages in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. According to Israeli 
claims, total water supply and per capita use in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories has increased significantly during the period 
of the Israeli administration. Israeli hydrologists say there is limited 
connection between the ground water in Gaza and Israel and that the 
salination ofwells in Gaza is solely the result ofyears ofoverpumping 
by the Palestinians prior to 1967. Israel also points out that many 
Palestinian claims of wells and springs drying up coincided with the 
1988-91 drought period and may have nothing to do with Israel's 
water development projects. 
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